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Abstract
We study the relationship between ethnicity, occupational choice, and entre-
preneurship. Immigrant groups in the United States cluster in specic business
sectors. For example, Koreans are 34 times more likely than other immigrants
to operate dry cleaners, and Gujarati-speaking Indians are 108 times more likely
to manage motels. We develop a model of social interactions where non-work
relationships facilitate the acquisition of sector-specic skills. The resulting scale
economies generate occupational stratication along ethnic lines, consistent with
the reoccurring phenomenon of small, socially-isolated groups achieving consid-
erable economic success via concentrated entrepreneurship. Empirical evidence
from the United States supports our models underlying mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
Minority groups often concentrate in specic occupations and with a bent towards
entrepreneurship. Kuznets (1960) observes that "all minorities are characterized, at
a given time, by an occupational structure distinctly narrower than that of the total
population and the majority." While the particular ethnic group and the particular
occupation in which the group specializes varies over time and with location, special-
ization as a rule occurs in ethnic groups that are socially cohesive and in occupations
where self-employment is the norm. Prominent examples of such ethnic specializations
are the Jewish merchants in Medieval Europe, the Chinese launderers in early twen-
tieth century California, and more recently the Korean dry cleaners and the Indian
motel owners in the United States.
Occupational choice and entrepreneurship are correlated with ethnicity even when
accounting for di¤erences in demographic characteristics and other quantiable at-
tributes. The generating mechanism behind these self-employment clusters must there-
fore involve sorting based on unobservable characteristics that are correlated with eth-
nicity. While individual characteristics can be linked to ethnicity because of di¤erences
in the social and legal status or the unique historical experiences of each ethnic group,
choice behavior can also generate group di¤erences. Variation in occupational structure
need not always result from systematic di¤erences between ethnic groups, but as we
show in this paper, occupational choice and entrepreneurship can also be a stratifying
force in itself.1
We contribute to the understanding of group di¤erences by developing a theory of
how economic behavior can lead to stratication. This theory is related to the concept
of ethnic capital as developed by Borjas (1992, 1995), but it emphasizes choice and
interactions more explicitly than does the standard treatment of ethnic capital. By
tying together occupational choice with social interactions, entrepreneurship and skill
acquisition, we show how social relationships in e¢ cient markets can generate long-run
occupational stratication, and as a consequence lead to persistent di¤erences in eco-
nomic outcomes between groups. We also demonstrate how occupational specialization
is especially likely to appear in small groups, and, in direct contrast to the e¤ects of
discrimination in the marketplace as analyzed by Becker (1957), we show how social
interactions can sometimes favor minority groups over the majority.
Beginning with occupational concentration, minority groups that successfully spe-
cialize in business activities appear in many economies throughout history, and tradi-
tional explanations focus on the temporary nature of some stays or explicit restrictions
1In the context of this paper, the terms self-employed, entrepreneur, and business owner have very
similar meanings and are used interchangeably. In a similar manner, it will become evident that the
ethnic specialization we depict can be thought of in terms of occupational or industry concentration
(e.g., concentration of self-employment for the taxi cab industry).
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on activity.2 These earlier explanations do not apply very well to the United States to-
day, however, and yet we continue to observe many specialized ethnic groups that have
settled permanently. Prominent examples include ethnic groups from Korea, Greece,
India, and the Middle East. This concentration can be very sharp, with a striking 45%
of adult Korean males being self-employed, in contrast to 15% of the adult male immi-
grant population as a whole. Furthermore, di¤erent groups cluster in di¤erent business
sectors: Yemeni are 75 times more likely to own grocery stores than other immigrants,
and Gujarati-speaking Indians are 108 times more likely to operate motels. Likewise,
Greeks concentrate in the restaurant sector, and Middle Eastern immigrants cluster in
grocery stores and liquor stores. We consider in this paper how social interactions can
prompt this regular feature across many diverse groups.
Turning to social interactions and skill acquisition, we use the term "social interac-
tion" here to describe interaction that takes place outside of work: family gatherings,
religious and cultural functions, meetings with friends, and similar. A considerable lit-
erature analyzes the importance of social interactions for economic behavior outside of
the workplace (e.g., Glaeser et al., 1996; Bertrand et al., 2000; Glaeser and Scheinkman,
2002). A smaller literature looks at the role of social interactions for workplace out-
comes. In the context of occupational choice, Granovetter (1973) nds that jobs often
are found through referrals, and that these tend to come from more casual acquain-
tances, so-called "weak ties." Montgomery (1991) provides a comprehensive survey of
the incidence of jobs found through referrals, and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2006) and
Durlauf and Ioannides (2010) are broader reviews.
Skill acquisition is potentially an even more important aspect of relationships in
determining occupational choice. Private information and tacit knowledge are instru-
mental to productivity in many occupations. For example, self-employed entrepreneurs
in the small business sector are their own managers, and they must rely on their own
judgment to make business decisions. Skills in this sector may come in the form of
knowledge of how to start or take over a business; information about market condi-
tions (e.g., demand levels, pricing); knowledge of how to establish supplier, customer,
2Examples include the Jews in Medieval Europe and around the Mediterranean, the Armenians in
the Ottoman Empire, the Jains and the Parsis in India, the Lebanese in West Africa, the Indians in
East Africa, the Japanese in South America, and the Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean.
Several works in sociology analyze this phenomenon, with Blalock (1967) applying the term "mid-
dleman minorities" to these groups. Bonacich (1973) put forward what is known as the "sojourner
theory," explaining specialization as the outcome of temporary residence; more recently, Botticini and
Eckstein (2005) study path dependence and Jewish occupational specialization, which they propose is
the outcome of a religious literacy requirement. More broadly, Aldrich and Waldinger (1990) review
the sociology literature on ethnic entrepreneurship, and Sowell (1981) analyzes the role of culture
more generally. Related classic work also includes Milgram (1967), Light (1977), Thernstrom (1980),
Landa (1981), Milgrom et al. (1990), Melton (1990), Sowell (1996), Cohen (1997), Greif (1993), and
Greif et al. (1994).
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and employee relationships; and insights into legal and tax-related issues. These skills
are valuable and cannot be instantaneously transferred from one entrepreneur to an-
other. Chung and Kalnins (2006) further trace out resource access through ethnic
networks in the case of Gujarati hotel owners.
Social interaction with people in the same industry can reduce the cost of skill
acquisition. Industry information and professional advice can be exchanged at little or
no time cost while attending a family gathering or a religious ceremony, and interaction
can therefore be complementary to skill acquisition.3 This role of social interaction is
di¢ cult to measure directly since few datasets contain information about horizontal
relationships such as friendship and extended family. Fairlie and Robb (2007) document
from the Characteristics of Business Owners database that more than half of business
owners have close relatives who are self-employed, and a quarter of business owners
have worked for these relatives. Datasets linking vertically across generations are more
common. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) nd that the incidence of self-employment,
controlled for other factors, doubles when an individuals parents are self-employed.
We unite these features by making an important distinction between market in-
teraction and social interaction that is central to our analysis. The social interaction
theory that we develop di¤ers from the standard theory of discrimination. We analyze
the case when groups are economically integrated but culturally isolated; groups are
assumed to be exclusive in their social interactions, while fully participating in the
market economy. In this case, no discrimination coe¢ cient as in Becker (1957) taxes
the market transactions between groups. To illustrate how market interaction can take
place without social interaction, consider a scene from Shakespeares The Merchant of
Venice (Act 1, Scene III) depicting the social divide between the Christians and Jews
in Renaissance Europe. Following a negotiation over a large loan to a Christian man
who has always scorned him, the Jewish moneylender Shylock comments: "I will buy
with you, sell with you, talk with you, walk with you, and so following; but I will not
eat with you, drink with you, nor pray with you."
Both market interaction and social interaction generate stratication, but in dif-
ferent forms and with di¤erent economic consequences. Minorities are put at a dis-
advantage in industries where market interaction is important, and are consequently
driven out of these sectors; a group speaking only a minority language would for ex-
ample have a hard time competing in an industry such as academia.4 Discrimination
3The complementarity between social interaction and skill acquisition can be derived in several
ways. First, if people derive utility from spending time in the presence of friends, mentoring friends
may provide more utility than mentoring non-friends. Second, people spend signicant time at social
events, and business knowledge can di¤use among participants. Third, people may trust the reciprocity
of friends and therefore share knowledge, expecting future favors in return.
4Market interaction can also generate specialization at the establishment level. For example,
kitchen workers in the restaurant business might stratify along ethnic lines. The result is that each
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in the marketplace, whether in the form of outright prejudice or simply the inability to
communicate in other languages, imposes greater economic cost on the minority than
on the majority (Becker, 1957), just as a small country is more dependent on trade
than a large country.5 This paper describes how social interactions can work in the
opposite direction of market interactions. Social complementarities in industries where
sector-specic skills are important can drive otherwise similar groups to specialize in
di¤erent sectors, and these social complementarities can result in a favorable economic
outcome for some minority groups.6
The next three sections formalize this conceptual structure. Section 2 develops a
two-group, two-sector model of identical agents where social interactions are random
within groups and where social relationships and production are complementary in one
sector. We characterize the e¢ cient outcome and show that di¤erent groups should
specialize in di¤erent sectors, with small groups having an absolute advantage in sectors
where the complementarity between interaction and production is strongest. Section 3
characterizes the competitive equilibrium. We introduce dynamics to demonstrate how
social interactions amplify initial group di¤erences and result in long-run occupational
specialization (Patel and Vella, 2013). We also show that under identical skill distrib-
utions for groups, mean earnings are positively related to a groups equilibrium level of
specialization. Section 4 analyzes relationships in a social network where interactions
are endogenously determined as the outcome of e¢ cient matching. Relating social net-
works to employment is akin to Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004), who develop a
social network model of job referrals that generates persistent employment di¤erences.
But while they take the social network as given, we derive the properties of a social
network that is endogenously determined. We show that the results of the random
interaction model in Section 2 are strengthened, provided that social relationships are
not close substitutes to one another.
Section 5 analyzes the models predictions using Census Bureau data for the United
States in 2000. Entrepreneurial activities and social interactions are clearly correlated,
but identifying interaction e¤ects is notoriously di¢ cult. Unobservable characteristics
establishment will have a homogenous workforce, but the ethnic composition at the industry level is
not a¤ected. Market interaction at the establishment level  such as in the restaurant example 
generates specialization at the establishment level, whereas market interaction at the industry level
 such as in academia  generates specialization at the industry level.
5Similar results are derived in a model of random encounters by Lazear (1999), who analyzes the
e¤ects of group size on assimilation. If ethnicity were endogenous in the model developed in this
paper, then assimilation pressures similar to those in Lazear (1999) would arise, although this could
be counterbalanced by the economic benets of belonging to a specialized minority group, as is made
clear later on in this paper.
6The favorable economic outcome does not necessarily carry over to utility. Depending on the
degree of endogeneity of social interaction, the overall situation for minority groups may still be worse
than the overall situation for the majority.
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can give rise to the reection problem described by Manski (1993). For example, since
people have a proclivity for cuisine from their home country, Greek restaurateurs will
sort into Greek restaurants and Chinese restaurateurs will sort into Chinese restaurants,
independent of social relationships. This sorting mechanism is well-understood and
very likely at work in some occupations. The interaction theory developed in this
paper has particular implications, however, that are suitable for testing. First, if
social interaction e¤ects are important, specialization should appear strongest in groups
that are socially isolated from the majority population. Case studies on successful
entrepreneurial groups show that indeed these groups tend to be socially cohesive,
as for example Indians in East Africa (Morris, 1956) and Lebanese in West Africa
(Winder, 1962). Second, predictions exist for the earnings of self-employed groups.
We rst provide extensive evidence of occupational clustering and entrepreneurship
among ethnic groups, related to Patel and Vella (2013). We show how the size of groups
and their social isolation, which we measure using in-marriage rates, strongly predict
occupational concentration for entrepreneurs from the ethnic group. A 10% decline
in group size raises entrepreneurial concentration in one industry by 6%, and a 10%
increase in group isolation boosts concentration by 5%. We show that these results are
robust under many specication variants. These results could be biased, however, by
omitted factors or reverse causality (e.g., occupational concentration leading to higher
in-marriage rates). We consider two instrument variable specications to address this
issue. One approach uses the 1980 group sizes and in-marriage rates in the United
States. Our second approach instruments US ethnic group size with the predictions
from a gravity model for migration to the United States and instruments US in-marriage
rates with those observed for the same ethnic group in the United Kingdom. These
estimations conrm the OLS results. We nally provide earnings estimations consistent
with the models predictions.
Our nal section concludes. Classic accounts of the nature of entrepreneurship
emphasize in equal measure disruptive forces that entrepreneurs generate (Schum-
peter, 1942, 1988) and their role in reducing price gaps and arbitrage opportunities
(Kirzner, 1972, 1979). These theories rarely provide specic pressures or predictions
for one group to become an entrepreneur versus another, except along dened traits like
ability to navigate uncertainty (Knight, 1921), risk tolerance (Kihlstrom and La¤ont,
1979), business acumen (Lucas, 1978), and skill mix (Lazear, 2005). Connections of
entrepreneurship to migration status have been frequently noted but poorly explained.
A central conclusion from this paper is that social interactions can generate group-
level e¤ects towards entrepreneurship and occupational choice that are important for
explaining, today and in times past, why some populations show a greater tendency
to self-employment, above and beyond other features that promote entry decisions.
Further research needs to continue building out these connections from social net-
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works and occupational structures to entrepreneurship given the general applicability
of these phenomena to many ethnic groups and their persistent roles in many cultures
and economies.
2 A Model of Specialization
The theory in this paper consists of two fundamental building blocks. First, social
interactions and production are complementary. Second, di¤erent social relationships
are not close substitutes for one another. The former is dealt with in this section, while
the latter is discussed extensively in Section 4 where relationships are analyzed in a
social network with endogenous matching.
2.1 Social Interaction as a Factor in Production
Consider a population where everyone has equal innate ability, divided into two ethnic
groups, A and B. Group A is in the minority, with a continuum of individuals of total
mass NA, and group B is the majority, with a continuum of individuals of total mass
NB, where NA < NB. Members of A and B interact in the marketplace but are socially
segregated and spend their leisure time separately. Assume that social interaction is
random within groups; each person interacts with a representative sample of individuals
in their own group only.7 This assumption of random interaction is relaxed in Section
4.
There are two occupations in our model: workers and entrepreneurs. Workers pro-
duce goods and entrepreneurs produce services in the form of selling the goods. Indus-
try knowledge is important to entrepreneurs but not to workers, since entrepreneurs (as
opposed to workers) are their own managers and have to rely on their own judgment
when they make business decisions. When socializing during family gatherings and
religious/cultural functions, entrepreneurs mentor each other and exchange industry
knowledge and professional advice.8 The more an entrepreneur socializes with other
entrepreneurs, the more knowledge is exchanged. Social interaction and production are
therefore complementary in the entrepreneurial sector and entrepreneurial productivity
increases with the number of friends and family members in that sector.
Dene Xl for l 2 fA;Bg as the fraction of the population in group l who are
entrepreneurs. This fraction is referred to as the groups degree of specialization. Since
social interaction is random within groups, a fraction Xl of the friends and family
7The terms "representative sample" and "random sample" are used interchangeably. They coincide
conceptually if the random sample is large enough, which is assumed to be the case.
8In addition to mentoring, social relationships can also improve the ability to extend credit. So-
cial ties increase the cost of breaking a contract, adding social repercussions to economic and legal
penalties.
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members of every individual in group l are entrepreneurs as well. Denote individual
entrepreneurial productivity in group l as  (Xl). Given that productivity increases
when socializing with other entrepreneurs, it follows that:
Assumption 1a Entrepreneurial productivity increases in specialization: 0 > 0.
This is the central component of the theory. Proceeding to specify a complete
economic environment, denote Q1 as the aggregate supply of services produced by
entrepreneurs. Aggregate supply can be written as a function of the occupational
distribution (XA; XB):
Q1 (XA; XB) = XANA (XA) +XBNB (XB) (1)
Since social interaction is assumed to play no productive role for workers, let the goods
sector exhibit constant returns to scale with worker productivity normalized to one.
Dening Q0 as the aggregate supply of goods, write this as:
Q0 (XA; XB) = (1 XA)NA + (1 XB)NB (2)
Moving from the supply-side to the demand-side, services and goods should be com-
plementary enough to avoid the complications of multiple optima possibly generated
by non-convexities. To simplify the exposition, let services and goods be perfect com-
plements. Consumers then have Leontief preferences with the utility function:
U (q0; q1) = min

q0;
q1
v

(3)
where v > 0 is a preference parameter and q0 and q1 are individual consumption of
goods and services, respectively.
2.2 The Pareto Problem
Since both commodities have unitary income elasticities, distributional aspects can be
ignored when characterizing the e¢ cient outcome. The problem simplies to choosing
an occupational distribution (XA; XB) that maximizes a representative utility function
U (Q0 (XA; XB) ; Q1 (XA; XB)). A marginal analysis is inappropriate since this is a
non-convex optimization problem. Consider instead the most specialized occupational
distributions, where either as many individuals as possible in group A or as many
individuals as possible in group B are entrepreneurs.
Figure 1 depicts the production possibilities for the two most specialized distribu-
tions. Dene V (XA; XB)  Q1Q0 as the ratio of the supply of services to goods under
the distribution (XA; XB). Along the curve with the kink V (1; 0) in the gure, group
A specializes as entrepreneurs. Starting from a position with only workers furthest to
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the right, As are added to the entrepreneurial sector moving leftward along the x-axis.
When reaching the kink V (1; 0), all As are entrepreneurs. Thereafter, continuing to
move leftward, Bs are also added to the sector until when reaching Q0 = 0, there are
no more workers in the economy. Similarly, along the curve with the kink V (0; 1),
group B specializes as entrepreneurs. Bs are added moving leftward along the x-axis
until reaching the kink V (0; 1), where all Bs are entrepreneurs. Thereafter also As are
added until reaching Q0 = 0.
{Insert Figure 1}
The curve with minority specialization is above the curve with majority specializa-
tion, so long as the entrepreneurial sector is su¢ ciently small. A large fraction of As
are entrepreneurs when the minority specializes, allowing minority entrepreneurs to so-
cialize mostly within their own occupation, greatly improving productivity. The same
is not true for the majority when they specialize, since even if a large fraction of entre-
preneurs are Bs, most Bs are nevertheless workers. As a result, majority entrepreneurs
spend their time socializing with workers instead of with other entrepreneurs.
The argument can be generalized to show that minority specialization is Pareto
e¢ cient so long as the entrepreneurial sector is small enough. Perfect complementarity
simplies the problem of solving for the optimal allocation, since any bundle where
goods and services are in the exact ratio v of the Leontief preferences (3) is strictly
preferable to all other bundles that do not include at least as much of both goods
and services. The Pareto optimal distribution (XA; XB) must therefore satisfy v =
V (XA; XB). Dene the total number of entrepreneurs in the population as M 
XANA +XBNB. It follows that:
Proposition 1 If v  V (1; 0), all entrepreneurs belong to minority A.
Proof: Take the distribution (XA; 0) where XA is such that v = V (XA; 0). This is
feasible since v  V (1; 0). Assume by contradiction that it is not the uniquely e¢ cient
distribution. Then there exists an alternative distribution (X 0A; X
0
B) with Q
0
1  Q1
and Q00  Q0. Given Q00  Q0 it follows that M 0  M , or equivalently, X 0ANA +
X 0BNB  XANA, which implies X 0A  XA and X 0B < XA, with X 0A < XA if X 0B = 0.
Manipulating the expression for Q01:
Q01 = (M
0  X 0BNB)  (X 0A) +X 0BNB (X 0B) (4)
< (M  X 0BNB)  (XA) +X 0BNB (XA) = Q1
This contradicts Q01  Q1. 
Consequently, the e¢ cient outcome requires that a single group specializes as en-
trepreneurs, and importantly, which group specializes is not arbitrary. Minority spe-
cialization is more e¢ cient since the minoritys social isolation enables entrepreneurs
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in A to socialize mostly within their own occupation. Proposition 1 implies that, for
v  V (1; 0), the transformation curve and the curve with minority specialization in
Figure 1 coincide. Group A has absolute and comparative advantages as entrepreneurs.
If the demand for services is su¢ ciently great, however, then the minority is too
small to satisfy demand by themselves. Instead, there is now a trade-o¤ between few,
highly-specialized minority entrepreneurs, or many unspecialized majority entrepre-
neurs. In the special case when v = V (0; 1), the demand for services is great enough
for group B to specialize completely. In this case minority involvement would just
serve to dilute majority entrepreneurship, and the Pareto e¢ cient solution is for Bs to
specialize.
Corollary If v = V (0; 1), all entrepreneurs belong to the majority, B.
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. As the corollary shows, the
relationship between group size and productivity is not monotonic. Rather, the group
with the absolute advantage is the group with a population size that most closely
adheres to the size of the sector where social interaction and production are comple-
mentary. Other production possibilities generated by more unspecialized occupational
distributions, such as XA = XB, are not displayed in Figure 1. Since some of these
production plans could be above the two specialized curves in the Figure, the transfor-
mation frontier cannot be fully characterized at this stage. The production function
must be restricted further to allow a complete characterization.
2.3 Quality and Convex Productivity
In addition to the quantity of friends that are entrepreneurs, the quality of these
friends could also matter for productivity. Let individual productivity increase both in
the quantity and in the average productivity of fellow entrepreneurs. Write this as:
 = + Xl (5)
where  > 0 is a productivity term, 0 <  < 1 is a social multiplier, Xl is the fraction
of entrepreneurs in group l, and  is the average productivity of these entrepreneurs.
Solving for equilibrium productivity by setting  equal to , individual productivity is
a function:
 (Xl) =

1  Xl (6)
It follows that productivity is convex in the degree of specialization, when taking both
the quantity and the quality of interaction into account.9 With this result in mind,
9This specication highlights the di¤erences from a standard interaction model. The standard
model is generally specied so that individual productivity is a function of a group-specic term 
and the discounted mean of the group, . Solving  = + , interaction exacerbates the di¤erence
in  across groups,  = 1  > , but the degree of specialization Xl has no e¤ect on productivity.
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assume for now that productivity is indeed convex.
Assumption 1B Productivity is convex in specialization: 00 > 0.
Assumption 1B is unnecessary for the results in the next sections, but it is useful
now to allow a full characterization of the e¢ cient solution without having to resort to
explicit functional form. Convex productivity gives the following result:
Lemma If productivity is convex, both groups never work in both sectors.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that an e¢ cient distribution (XA; XB) exists where
0 < Xl < 1 for l = fA;Bg. Consider a marginal change  in the ethnic composition of
entrepreneurs while holding xed the overall number of entrepreneursM (and therefore
also the supply of goods). Taking the derivative of Q1 with respect to , and evaluating
it at  = 0:
@Q1
@

XA +

NA
; XB   
NB

=  (XA) +XA
0 (XA)   (XB) XB0 (XB) (7)
Since (XA; XB) is e¢ cient, and since Xl is interior, this derivative has to be zero.10
But with convex productivity the derivative is zero only at XA = XB, which is the
global minimum. This contradicts e¢ ciency. 
The e¢ cient economy aims for maximum ethnic homogeneity in entrepreneurship.
Ruling out that both groups work in both sectors implies that only the specialized
distributions along the two curves depicted in Figure 1 could possibly coincide with the
transformation frontier. The shape of the entire transformation frontier can therefore
be deduced by tracing out the maximum of the two curves in that Figure.
Proposition 2 If productivity is convex, there is a cuto¤ value v such that for
v < v, the minority specializes as entrepreneurs, whereas for v > v, the majority
specializes.
Figure 2 shows how the degree of specialization varies with the size of the entre-
preneurial sector, as governed by v, and the cuto¤ value v for primary group special-
ization.
{Insert Figure 2}
The greater the value of v, the greater is the demand for services and the more
people work in the entrepreneurial sector. As the sector increases in size in Figure 2,
the interaction externality generates a characteristic discrete jump from one type of
equilibrium to another. At the point v, where many from group B have also joined
the entrepreneurial sector, the economy abruptly moves from minority specialization
to majority specialization.
10If the derivative is nonzero, then the supply of services could increase while keeping the supply of
goods constant. By subsequently increasing the number of workers marginally, a Pareto improvement
is feasible, thus contradicting e¢ ciency.
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2.4 The Case of Non-Convex Productivity
Finally, to see that convexity is needed for the Lemma on ethnic homogeneity to hold,
consider a non-convex production function where a threshold fraction must work as
entrepreneurs for interaction to have value:  > 0 if Xl  b and zero otherwise.
This specication violates the assumption that productivity is strictly increasing in
the degree of specialization. Then, if the demand for services is so great that a single
group cannot satisfy it entirely, v > V (0; 1), and if in addition V (b; b) < v < V (b; 1),
e¢ ciency requires that both groups work in both sectors, contradicting the Lemma.
To see why, consider what would happen if one of the groups specialized completely.
In this case the non-specialized groups degree of specialization would be positive but
below b, causing entrepreneurs in that group to have zero productivity. If, however, the
occupational distribution was unspecialized instead, withXA = XB, then entrepreneurs
in both groups would be as productive as those in the most productive group were under
the alternative. Clearly this would be Pareto superior, contradicting the Lemma. This
special case shows how the Lemma fails for non-convex productivity, and how in this
case the qualitative features of specialization will depend on specic functional form
assumptions. Recall however that the results for both v  V (1; 0) and v = V (0; 1) are
more general and apply both for convex and non-convex productivity.
2.5 Skill-Specicity and Multi-Sector Extension
The two-sector model can be directly applied to data if entrepreneurial skills are suf-
ciently general to encompass all forms of entrepreneurial activity: if, for example,
operating a dry cleaning shop requires similar skills as operating a motel or a liquor
store. If skills are more sector-specic, then a multisector framework is more appropri-
ate. Although we do not develop a multi-sector model here, similar principles apply as
in the two-sector model. In some special cases the e¢ cient outcome is also intuitively
similar to the two-sector model.
For example, consider an economy with two entrepreneurial sectors instead of just
one, with equal demand for both services, and where there are two minority groups
instead of just one, both equal in size. If the demand for entrepreneurial services is
su¢ ciently small, then the e¢ cient outcome is for one minority group to specialize
in one entrepreneurial sector, and for the other minority group to specialize in the
other sector. Which minority group specializes in which sector is arbitrary. In this
multi-sector economy with sector-specic skills, otherwise-similar groups consequently
specialize in di¤erent business sectors.
An interesting extension for future work is to include both general and specic skills
in the same framework. In such a model of spillovers between sectors, it should be pos-
sible to derive stratication in overall entrepreneurial activity as well as stratication
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between di¤erent forms of entrepreneurship at the same time. This would correspond
to the current situation in the United States, where groups like the Koreans are strongly
clustered in a few business sectors, while at the same time being overrepresented in
almost all other business activities as well.
3 The Price Equilibrium
The previous section characterized the e¢ cient outcome. The focus now turns to the
competitive outcome. An equilibrium analysis will yield two insights into how social
interaction a¤ects the occupational distribution. First, it shows how stratifying forces
act to make groups more and more di¤erent, and second, how group earnings are
positively related to the degree of specialization.
To see how social interaction works as a stratifying force, begin by introducing time
into the analysis, with t = 0; 1; :::;1. Dynamics are built into the model by making
the interaction e¤ect work with a lag. Denote by X tl the degree of specialization
in period t for group l, and let individual entrepreneurial productivity in period t
be a function 
 
X t 1l

. This one-period lag specication for the interaction e¤ect
could easily be generalized to a distributed lag. Interaction now e¤ectively works as a
form of social capital, with the groups occupational activities in the previous period
beneting individual productivity today. Let pt1 and p
t
0 be the prices of services and
goods respectively. Entrepreneurial earnings are yt1;l = p
t
1
 
X t 1l

and worker earnings
are yt0;l = p
t
0. Competitive occupational choice is straightforward to derive in this
setting; dening the relative price of goods to services as pt = p
t
0
pt1
, an individual in
group l joins the entrepreneurial sector if:

 
X t 1l
  pt (8)
and favors being a worker if 
 
X t 1l
  pt. Since individuals have identical skills,
aggregate labor supply for group l is discontinuous, with:
X tl =
8<:
1 if 
 
X t 1l

> pt
[0; 1] if 
 
X t 1l

= pt
0 if 
 
X t 1l

< pt:
(9)
Avoid for now the knife-edge unspecialized case where X t 1A = X
t 1
B . Since there is a
single price of labor, pt, at least one of the two groups A and B must then be in a
corner: 
X tA; X
t
B

=

(X tA = 1; 0 < X
t
B) or (X
t
A  1; X tB = 0) if X t 1A > X t 1B
(0 < X tA; X
t
B = 1) or (X
t
A = 0; X
t
B  1) if X t 1A < X t 1B
(10)
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In equilibrium, supply must satisfy (10) and production must meet demand so
that markets clear. Because of perfect complementarity, meeting demand reduces to
satisfying v = V (X tA; X
t
B). The resulting equilibrium distribution is unique. To see
why, take the case when group l is more specialized than group l0 in the previous
period, with X t 1l > X
t 1
l0 . Given that at least one of the two groups must be in a
corner according to (10), the equilibrium distribution must either be of the type (X tl ; 0)
or of the type (1; X tl0). Since the function V is strictly increasing in both arguments,
it follows that V (1; X tl0) > V (X
t
l ; 0). Only one distribution can consequently make V
equal to v.
The equilibrium distribution is therefore uniquely determined by the distribution
in the previous period. Continuing to avoid the knife-edge unspecialized case, dene a
function  that maps every previous distribution into a new distribution: 
X tA; X
t
B

= 
 
X t 1A ; X
t 1
B

(11)
Next, proceed to characterize stationary equilibrium distributions. Like other equi-
librium distributions, stationary distributions must satisfy (10) and must meet demand.
Following the same argument as above, based on V being strictly increasing in both
arguments, it follows that there is a stationary equilibrium where each of the two
groups specialize. Denote the stationary distribution as
 
XAA ; X
A
B

when the minority
specializes, and the stationary distribution as
 
XBA ; X
B
B

when the majority specializes.
{Insert Figure 3}
Finally, returning for a moment to the unspecialized knife-edge case where X t 1A =
X t 1B , this type of initial condition is of measure zero and therefore not elaborated on.
Note only that since V is strictly increasing in both arguments, there can only be one
such stationary unspecialized equilibrium distribution. Denote that equilibrium distri-
bution as
 
XUA ; X
U
B

. In the unspecialized case, although there is only one stationary
equilibrium, the uniqueness of equilibria no longer applies. To summarize, there are
consequently three stationary equilibrium distributions: two specialized,
 
XAA ; X
A
B

and 
XBA ; X
B
B

, and one unspecialized,
 
XUA ; X
U
B

. Figure 3 above shows the two specialized
equilibria, as well as the knife-edge equilibrium, when v is less than V (1; 0).
3.1 Occupational Stratication
The following section shows that the dynamic system in (11) converges to a station-
ary specialized equilibrium, so long as the interaction externality is not too strong.11
Consider what happens to the aggregate production of entrepreneurial services when
11This section only deals with unspecialized initial conditions, which establishes convergence on
measure one.
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one (innitesimal) person in group l joins the entrepreneurial sector. First, aggregate
production increases by an amount equal to the individual productivity of that per-
son,  (Xl). In addition, all other entrepreneurs in group l benet from the interaction
externality when socializing with this entrepreneur. Individual productivity therefore
increases by 1
Nl
0 (Xl) for all XlNl entrepreneurs in group l. Consequently, the inter-
nalized e¤ect on aggregate production of one person joining the entrepreneurial sector
is  (Xl), and the external e¤ect is Xl
0 (Xl). Assume that the external e¤ect is smaller
than the internal e¤ect.12
Assumption 2 The internal e¤ect dominates: 0 (Xl)Xl <  (Xl).
This condition is satised if productivity is concave in Xl, but it also holds for some
convexity as long as  (0) > 0. To see why the assumption is needed for the system to
be stable, consider the extreme case when group A has no mass at all, with NA = 0.
Since the derivative of V with respect to X tA is zero in this case, group A can be ignored
altogether in the general equilibrium analysis. There is then a single stationary level
of specialization for group B; denote this value as XB.
Consider a perturbation in period t so that the majority starts out with too many
entrepreneurs, X tB > X

B, shown in Figure 4 below. Such a deviation boosts the
interaction e¤ect in period t+1 relative to the stationary equilibrium,  (X tB) >  (X

B).
With perfect complementarity, the supply of both goods and services must therefore
increase relative to their stationary equivalents. Increasing the production of goods
requires an increase in the number of workers, and consequently, a decrease in the
number of entrepreneurs to below the stationary value XB. With fewer entrepreneurs
in period t+ 1 than the stationary number of entrepreneurs, the tables turn in period
t + 2, so that the interaction e¤ect now is reduced to below that in the stationary
equilibrium. Reducing the production of both goods and services in period t + 2 in
response, the number of workers in period t + 2 has to decrease and the number of
entrepreneurs has to increase relative to the stationary equilibrium. These reversals
repeat every period in cobweb-style dynamics.13
{Insert Figure 4}
The question of whether the system is stable reduces to whether the number of
entrepreneurs in period t + 2 is less than the number of entrepreneurs in period t, so
that the degree of specialization in groupB gets closer and closer to the stationary value
XB over time. Using the derived direction of the change in the production of services,
12We thank Rachel Soloveichik for this interpretation of Assumption 2.
13The ip-opping character of the equilibrium distribution is a result of the one-period lag speci-
cation for the interaction e¤ect. The occupational distribution would change more gradually with a
more general specication allowing for distributed lags.
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Qt+11 > Q
t+2
1 , this latter inequality can be equivalently expressed, after multiplying and
dividing the left-hand side by X tB, and dividing both sides by X
t+1
B NB, as:
X tB
 (X tB)
X tB
> X t+2B

 
X t+1B

X t+1B
(12)
Given that productivity is not too convex, as stipulated by Assumption 2, it follows
that (Xl)
Xl
is strictly decreasing in Xl. Since X tB > X
t+1
B , equation (12) then establishes
that X tB > X
t+2
B . This proves convergence and the stability of group Bs degree of
specialization around XB.
Having established stability in the case of NA = 0, the same example also serves to
show how the stratifying force comes into play. Let group B be in its stable state, with
X tB = X

B, and perturb the minoritys occupational distribution so that X
t
A > X

B.
Since group B is so much greater in size than group A, the former is una¤ected by the
perturbation and the price continues to be locked in at pt+1 =  (XB). The interaction
e¤ect in period t+1, generated by the perturbation in period t, then results in everyone
in group A becoming more productive as entrepreneurs than as workers, with  (X tA) >
pt+1. Group As degree of specialization consequently jumps from X tA to X
t+1
A = 1, and
the occupational distribution stays in this stratied state forever. This stratication
result is extended in the appendix for the general case of any population size of the
two groups, and it follows that for l 2 fA;Bg and l0 2 fA;Bg:
Proposition 3 Initial di¤erences result in long-run specialization: If group l is more
specialized than group l0 initially, X0l > X
0
l0, then group l specializes in the long run
and the limiting distribution is
 
X lA; X
l
B

.
This also implies that the stationary unspecialized equilibrium
 
XUA ; X
U
B

is unsta-
ble. If the minority is slightly more specialized initially, then the economy converges
to minority specialization
 
XAA ; X
A
B

, and if the opposite is true, then the economy
converges to majority specialization
 
XBA ; X
B
B

. Over time, social segregation amplies
initial group di¤erences.
3.2 Initial Conditions and Multiple Groups
Depending on the initial conditions, as is clear from Proposition 3, either of the two
groups A and B can specialize as entrepreneurs. Social interaction amplies initial
di¤erences, but it does not explain why they are there to begin with. The di¤erence
in group size has some implications for what initial conditions to expect, however.
Consider an economy with more than two groups. As before, the group that is
most entrepreneurial initially will specialize in the long run. If the initial occupational
distribution is subject to randomness, one of the smaller groups is likely to be the
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most specialized initially. To see why, let the initial distribution be generated by
random draws, where each person becomes an entrepreneur with probability .14 This
probability structure results in the same expected initial degree of specialization for all
groups, but since the population size varies across groups, the variance in the degree of
specialization also varies. The smallest groups have the largest variance, and therefore,
the smallest groups are most likely to exhibit the lowest and also the greatest initial
degrees of specialization. Consequently, with the smallest groups the most likely to
specialize initially, as interaction amplies initial di¤erences over time, the smallest
groups are also the most likely to specialize in the long run.
3.3 Heterogeneity and Earnings
Social complementarities also have implications for earnings. To examine how inter-
action e¤ects would show up in earnings data, it is necessary to move away from the
framework of identical skills. Returning to a static environment, endow each person
i with entrepreneurial skills s1 (i) and worker skills s0 (i). Entrepreneurial earnings
are now a function of both interactions and skills. Denote the earnings of individual
i in group l when she is an entrepreneur as y1 (Xl; i) = p1 (Xl) s1 (i), and when she
is a worker as y0 (i) = p0s0 (i). Dening the ratios s  s1s0 , p 
p0
p1
, and q  py1
y0
,
the earnings-maximizing occupational choice of individual i is to consider becoming an
entrepreneur if:
q (Xl; i)  p (13)
and to consider being a worker if q (Xl; i)  p. Here the term q (Xl; i) =  (Xl) s (i) sum-
marizes the individuals comparative advantage in entrepreneurship, at parity prices,
as a function of social interaction and skills.
When individuals have di¤erent skills, the character of the price equilibrium de-
pends crucially on the marginal entrepreneur and how his comparative advantage
changes as more and more untalented people become entrepreneurs. If the benets
of interaction are weak and the marginal entrepreneur "deteriorates" as the more in-
trinsically untalented people enter the business, then the economy reduces to a standard
Roy model, or sorting model, with a unique unspecialized equilibrium. Only if the in-
teraction e¤ect is strong enough to overcome skill heterogeneity can interaction change
the character of the equilibrium.
{Insert Figure 5}
Without loss of generality, order individuals from the greatest to the smallest
comparative advantage in entrepreneurship, so that the skill ratio is decreasing in
14These draws can be partially correlated within groups with the assumption that the correlation
is the same for every group.
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i, s0 (i)  0. The marginal entrepreneur is then the individual indexed by i = Xl, and
her comparative advantage is q (Xl; Xl). To prevent the economy from reducing to a
sorting model, assume that the interaction e¤ect trumps heterogeneity:
Assumption 3 Interaction dominates at the margin: d
dXl
q (Xl; Xl) > 0.
This assumption implies that the solid line in Figure 5 is upward sloping. The
equilibrium distribution (XA; XB) must be competitively supplied and enough goods
and services must be produced to meet demand. Using a similar line of reasoning as
in the previous section, based on V being strictly increasing in both arguments, it
follows from Assumption 3 that there are three equilibria: one unstratied, denoted 
XUA ; X
U
B

; one where minority A specializes, denoted
 
XAA ; X
A
B

; and one where ma-
jority B specializes, denoted
 
XBA ; X
B
B

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In the equilibrium where minority A specializes as entrepreneurs, the mean earnings
of As are higher than the mean earnings of Bs, and vice versa in the equilibrium where
group B specializes. To see why, let y = max (y0; y1) be actual individual earnings,
and denote mean group earnings as  =
R 1
0
ydi.
Proposition 4 Earnings covary with entrepreneurship:  (Xl) >  (Xl0) if Xl > Xl0.
Proof: Since people sort into occupations, mean earnings can be rewritten as
 (Xl) =
Z 1
0
y0 (i) di+
Z Xl
0
(y1 (Xl; i)  y0 (i)) di (14)
Rearranging, the di¤erence in mean earnings between the two groups is:
 (Xl)   (Xl0) =
Z Xl0
0
(y1 (Xl; i)  y1 (Xl0 ; i)) di+
Z Xl
Xl0
(y1 (Xl; i)  y0 (i)) di (15)
where both parts of the expression are positive. The rst part is strictly positive due to
the interaction e¤ect, @y1(Xl;i)
@Xl
> 0, and the second part is positive because of sorting,
y1 (Xl; i)  y0 (i) for all i  Xl. 
This unequivocal e¤ect on mean earnings at the group level does not carry through
to the sectoral level. Depending on the joint distribution of skills, mean earnings in
either sector can increase or decrease as interaction increases entrepreneurial produc-
tivity and shifts people of di¤erent ability between sectors. The e¤ect of interaction
on sectoral earnings is similar to the e¤ect of changing skill prices, which cannot be
signed for a general skill distribution (Heckman and Honore, 1990).
15Note that Assumptions 2 and 3, when combined, put both an upper and a lower bound on the
interaction e¤ect:  d ln sdXl < d ln dXl < 1Xl .
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The di¤erence in mean earnings, normalized in units of goods, is shown in Figure 6
below for the equilibrium with minority specialization. The exact derivation is included
in the appendix. The relative price of goods to services is always such that the marginal
entrepreneur is indi¤erent between sectors. Keeping track of whether the marginal
entrepreneur is in group A or in group B depending on the occupational distribution,
the equilibrium price can be expressed as:
p =

q (Xl; Xl) if Xl > Xl0 and Xl0 = 0, or Xl < Xl0 and Xl > 0
q (Xl0 ; Xl0) if Xl > Xl0 and Xl0 > 0, or Xl < Xl0 and Xl = 0
(16)
When increasing the size of the entrepreneurial sector in the equilibrium with minority
specialization, the relative price of goods to services increases continuously as the
marginal entrepreneur in group A becomes more and more productive. This increase
in price continues until all As are entrepreneurs.
{Insert Figure 6}
To expand the entrepreneurial sector further from the point where everyone in
group A are entrepreneurs, the price has to drop discretely from p = q (1; 1) to q (0; 0),
to lure the unproductive Bs into the entrepreneurial sector as well. The earnings
di¤erential between groups A andB moves accordingly, as shown in Figure 6, increasing
continuously until all As are entrepreneurs, at which point earnings jump in response
to the discontinuous drop in the relative price.
4 Relationships in a Social Network
Since interactions have been restricted to be random, the analysis has so far abstracted
from changes in the social structure that could arise in response to the productive value
of interaction. The most interesting question is whether the majority will split up into
smaller social groups, formed around occupation, to capitalize on interaction. If such
splinter groups could form costlessly, then social interaction would no longer be able
to generate occupational stratication along ethnic lines.
By developing a utility-based theory of interaction, explicitly stating social prefer-
ences and characterizing the optimal social structure, this section shows that splinter
groups will not arise so long as preferences are su¢ ciently diverse, and so long as dif-
ferent social relationships are not close substitutes for one another. Under these two
premises it is costly to conne social interactions to within a small group since the
quality of social matches deteriorates with decreasing group size.
The theory developed in this section is constructed around a standard marriage
market as in Becker (1973). In addition to spousal matching, people are also related
by birth, which yields a larger social structure where individuals are interrelated not
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just pairwise but in a social network. Since the social network is derived as the out-
come of matching, the problem analyzed here is di¤erent in nature from the problems
most commonly analyzed in the social network literature, for example in Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996), which focuses on strategic interaction between identical agents.
4.1 The Marriage Market
Take a very large nite population i = 1; :::; N , which is divided into mutually exclusive
and exhaustive families by birth, with each family consisting of d > 3 individuals.
Every person i independently draws a trait ti, which could be for example beauty or
intelligence, uniformly distributed between zero and one:
Assumption 4 Individual traits ti are independent draws.
The independence of the draw signies what can be thought of as maximal diversity:
even within families people have di¤erent traits.
Based on realized traits, each person is assigned a spouse. To simplify, there are no
gender restrictions and spouses can belong to the same family.16 Traits are assumed
to be complementary inputs in marriage. A marriage between i and j yields utility
u (ti; tj), where the function u is symmetric and strictly increasing with a positive
cross-derivative:
Assumption 5 Inputs are complementary: u (ti; tj) = u (tj; ti), u1 > 0, u2 > 0 and
u1;2 > 0.
Since di¤erent relationships produce di¤erent utility, social relationships are not
perfect substitutes and there is an optimal matching of spouses. Assume that utility
is transferable, in which case the e¢ cient spousal matching has to maximize aggregate
utility. Labelling individuals according to rank, so that t1 < t2 < :::,17 it follows that
the e¢ cient matching is positively assortative: person one marries person two, person
three marries person four, ..., and person N   1 marries person N . See the appendix
for proof.
4.2 Splinter Groups
Say that two people i and j are related if they are married and/or belong to the same
family. Dene a splinter group as a proper subset of the population where no one in
the subset is related to anyone outside of that subset. Given an e¢ cient assignment of
16Removing gender restrictions maps this problem into a one-sided assortative matching problem.
One-sided assortative matching is used in a di¤erent context in Kremer (1993).
17Since having equal-valued traits, ti = tj , is of measure zero, this possibility is ignored.
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spouses in a very large population where traits are independently distributed, it follows
that:
Proposition 5 The probability that splinter groups exist is zero.
See the appendix for proof. A partial explanation for this result is that if person i
marries person j, then because of the independence of traits, it is unlikely that anyone
else in is family marries into js family as well. As the population grows larger, it
becomes less and less likely that there is more than one marriage between the families
of i and j. This "mismatch" prevents i and j, and their families, from socially isolating
themselves from the larger population.
The problem is more interesting than what this partial intuition conveys, however.
The likelihood of more than one marriage between two particular families decreases as
the population grows larger, but on the other hand, the number of families for whom
this event could occur increases. If, for example, d had been equal to two, then these
two e¤ects would have balanced, so that small splinter groups would have formed even
as the population approached innity. In addition to the proof in the appendix of why
no splinter groups occur when d is greater than three, the appendix also presents a more
structured intuition for the result, using a branching tree to trace out relationships in
the population.
4.3 Implications for Productivity
The social network developed here allows more individual choice than the random in-
teraction model analyzed earlier, since here occupational choice can be made contingent
on every aspect of the social structure. The main results from the random interaction
model continue to hold nevertheless. A large group cannot align social relationships
so as to maximize productivity in a small sector where social interaction and produc-
tivity are complementary, without incurring the cost of deteriorating social matches
that comes from breaking up into smaller groups. This follows from the result that no
splinter groups arise under rst-best matching on social traits. Since the social choice
set of ethnic minority groups is restricted anyway, these groups can limit their social
interactions to a single sector at no alternative cost. Ethnic minorities are therefore
well suited for social interaction-intensive occupations.
A social network with the same properties could also be derived from a meeting
technology where spouses meet and marry at random. The social structure derived
here can therefore equally well be thought of as arising in a rigid environment where
people meet randomly, as arising from e¢ cient matching. Since randomness is likely to
play a role in who marries whom, this adds additional strength to the result. Breaking
up into smaller groups does not only carry a social utility cost, but also carries the cost
of bypassing random marriages.
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5 Analysis of US Entrepreneurial Stratication
This section assesses the extent to which the social isolation and small group sizes of
ethnic immigrant communities lead to entrepreneurial stratication. We begin with
a description of our US 2000 Census of Populations sample and our metrics for cal-
culating entrepreneurial clustering and social isolation. Our initial analysis includes
descriptive measures of prominent ethnic entrepreneurship groups and OLS regressions
of our ethnic concentration ratios on ethnic group size and isolation. We then address
endogeneity concerns using a two-stage least squares instrumental variable (IV) ap-
proach. We corroborate evidence through a series of robustness checks, including a
simulation methodology that veries our entrepreneurial cluster measures are robust
to controls for small ethnic group sizes. We close with a discussion of earnings.
5.1 US Census of Populations Data
We collect data from the 2000 Census of Populations using the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series (IPUMS). Our core empirical work focuses on the 5% state-level
sample, and we use person weights to create population-level estimates. The depth of
the 5% sample is important for generating su¢ cient samples in our detailed ethnicity-
industry bins for entrepreneurs and wage workers. We also use the 1980 5% sample to
construct one set of instruments, and a second set of instruments uses 1991 information
on the United Kingdom obtained from IPUMS-International.
We dene ethnic groups using detailed birthplace locations and to a lesser extent
detailed language measures. Birthplace locations form the primary groups, and we
merge related birthplace locations into the same ethnicity. For example, we collapse
Scotland, Wales, and non-specic United Kingdom designations into England. We
generally favor connecting groups that have undergone major geopolitical break-ups
to their current designations, but this is not always possible in some di¢ cult cases
like the Balkan states and states of the former Soviet Union. We also utilize the
language variable to create sub-groups among some larger birthplaces, for example
separating Gujarati and Punjabi Indian. In the end, our preparation develops 146
potential ethnic groups from 198 birthplace locations. As further described below,
most of our empirical work focuses on 77 larger ethnic groups that have at least one
industry where we observe ten or more IPUMS observations (equivalent to about 200
workers in the industry nationally depending upon sample weights).
We assign industry classication and self-employment status through the industry
and class-of-work variables. IPUMS uses a three-digit industry classication to cat-
egorize work setting and economic sector of employment. Industry is distinct from
a workers technical function or "occupation," and workers in multiple industries are
assigned to the industry of greatest income or amount of time spent. We utilize the
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1990 IPUMS industry delineations for temporal consistency. The class-of-work variable
identies self-employed and wage workers, and we exclude unemployed workers, those
out of the workforce, and those with unknown work status. We dene a "cluster" as
an {industry, class of work} pairing. For example, a self-employed hotelier is classied
di¤erently than a wage earner in the hotel and motels industry. Our empirical analysis
focuses on self-employment industries, and we consider total industry employment in
robustness checks. We drop observations of 24 industries in which self-employment is
non-existent (e.g., military, railroads, the US postal service, religious organizations).
Our nal sample includes 200 industries.
We narrow our sample using demographic information available in the IPUMS
dataset. For immigrants and US-born workers, we retain males between 30 and 65
years old who are living in metropolitan statistical areas. We further require that
immigrants arrived in the United States before 1990 to avoid issues related to migration
for temporary employment (which in the United States is typically in roles selected by
the sponsoring rm and can last for six years on the H-1B program). To circumvent
schooling decisions that are inuenced by other forms of social interaction than those
discussed here, we require that immigrants be at least 20 years of age at the time of
immigration to the United States. Immigrants must also have immigrated no earlier
than 1969.18 Our nal sample contains 1,604,350 observations representing 34,984,436
people when applying sample weights. Of these individuals, 143,327 observations,
representing 3,141,080 people, are immigrants.
5.2 Clustering in Entrepreneurial Activities
We study entrepreneurship through self-employment status. The use of the term "en-
trepreneurship" di¤ers greatly across studies, and our focus here is on a broad denition
that includes both employer rms and sole proprietors. Likewise, our denition cap-
tures rms with a full range of growth ambitions and prospects, from independent
artisans to high-growth rms supported by venture capital investors. As we consider
population-level counts, our denitions are mostly determined through "Main Street"
activity like restaurants, barber shops, construction, retail trade, and similar. Be-
cause classication is discrete in the class-of-work variable, we tend to only capture
self-employment when it is the main activity of an individual (e.g., not capturing aca-
demics who consult part-time to companies).
The central focus of our theory is on the concentration of ethnic entrepreneurs
in particular industries. We devise "overage" ratios, dened below, to quantify the
18The Immigration and Naturalization Services Act of 1965 abolished national origin restrictions,
allowing large-scale non-European immigration for the rst time since the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882. Our sample requires immigration no earlier than 1969 since the Act went into e¤ect in June of
1968.
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heightened rate of ethnic self-employment in a particular industry and also across a
range of industries. Our core metrics, used in most of our empirical analysis and
the default for the discussion below, only retain individuals that are self-employed,
considering variation in ethnic groups across industries. In robustness checks we also
calculate overage ratios on industry total employment, combining wage earners and
self-employed workers.19
To dene our metrics, we identify each employed worker xis ethnic group and
industry. We dene OV ERlk as the ratio of an ethnic group ls concentration in an
industry k to the industrys national employment share. Thus, if ethnic group l has
Nl total workers and Nkl workers in industry k, then X
k
l = N
k
l =Nl and OV ERlk =
Xkl =X
k. The subscript lk denotes that these two metrics are unique to each group-
industry pairing, and we calculate OV ERlk for each industry where the ethnic group
is employed.
To move from these industry-level values to analyses of entrepreneurial group con-
centration, our core estimates take a weighted average across industry-level overage
values for each ethnic group, with the weights being the share of the groups self-
employment that is present in that industry:
OV ER1l =
KX
k=1
OV ERlkX
k
l : (17)
Our estimations ultimately use the log value of this OV ER1 metric. We also consider
several variants in robustness checks. One set of robustness checks considers di¤erent
samples for OV ER1l, such as including rural populations or excluding natives from the
Xk denominators used in OV ERlk. A second approach varies the formula in several
ways:
1. Weighted average over the three largest industries for ethnic group l: OV ER2l =P3
k0=1OV ERlk0X
k0
l =
P3
k0=1X
k0
l , where k
0 = k such that
P3
k0=1N
k0
l is maximized.
2. Weighted average over the three largest industry-level overages for ethnic group l:
OV ER3l =
P3
k0=1OV ERlk0X
k0
l =
P3
k0=1X
k0
l , where k
0 = k such that
P3
k0=1OV ERlk0
is maximized.
3. Maximum overage: OV ER4l = maxl[OV ERlk]:
19It may seem appealing to use wage earners instead as a counterfactual to self-employed workers.
This approach, however, does not o¤er a good counterfactual as ethnic entrepreneurs show a greater
tendency to hire members of their own ethnic groups into their rms (e.g., Andersson et al., 2009,
2012; Åslund et al., 2012; Kerr et al., 2015). A Yemeni grocery store owner, taking as an example
our second most concentrated cluster discussed below in Table 1b, is far more likely to hire Yemeni
employees into the growing rm. We thus use this as a robustness check that provides us deeper
sample sizes.
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In making these calculations that measure extreme values, we need to be careful
about small sample size. We rst require that ethnicities included in our sample have
at least one industry where we possess ten or more IPUMS observations. Our concern
is that spurious clusters could appear in small ethnic groups and obscure industries due
to very small sample size or small population size. As an example of a spurious cluster,
consider an immigrant group with only two observations. By default this group will be
extremely overrepresented in at least one industry, since half or more of its population
must be working in a single industry. By focusing on settings where we observe at
least ten observations (equivalent to around 200 workers), we reduce the scope for
these biases.
After completing all of these data preparation steps, we have 77 ethnic groups
through which we can study entrepreneurial concentration hypotheses. OV ER1l then
takes the weighted sum across industries, while OV ER2l considers the three largest
industries for an ethnic group. In most cases, OV ER2l is bigger than OV ER1l as
concentration is often linked to substantial numerical representation; other cases exist
however where the three largest industries for an ethnic group have lower concentration
than the group as a whole due to the fact that they are focused on big industries. We
calculate our metrics of extreme values, captured in OV ER3l and OV ER4l, over ethnic
group-industry clusters where we have at least ten observations.
Table 1a provides our largest overage ratios ordered by OV ER1l. We nd evidence
of strong entrepreneurial clustering. For example, Gujarati Indians have an average
overage ratio of 33 across the industries of their self-employment work, and an aver-
age overage ratio of 59 in their three largest industries. Their max overage is in the
hotel and motel industry, which we further explore in Table 1b. Yemeni immigrants
display the overall highest industrial concentration for entrepreneurship, with partic-
ular emphasis on grocery stores. The last three columns of Table 1a provide broader
statistics about each ethnic group, such as its total employment (entrepreneurial and
wage workers), self-employment share, and in-marriage rates.20
Table 1b displays the maximum overages observed at the industry level for ethnic
groups, ordered by max self-employment overage. The table displays for the ethnic
groups their industry of max self-employment overage, the industry of max overage
when using all workers, and the industry where the most workers for the ethnic group
are occupied in terms of absolute counts. In 17 of 25 cases shown, the industry where
the ethnic group displays the highest concentration for self-employment is the same as
the industry where the ethnic group shows the highest concentration for total employ-
20Appendix Tables 1a and 1b report pairwise correlations and pairwise rank correlations for eight
variants in overage ratios. All correlations exceed 0.4 and are statistically signicant at a 5% level.
The greater tendency to entrepreneurship among immigrants evident in Table 1a has been previously
observed and discussed by Fairlee (2008), Hunt (2011), and Kerr and Kerr (2015). Kerr (2013) and
Fairlie and Lofstrom (2013) provide reviews.
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ment. In 8 of 25 cases, the industry of maximum concentration is also the industry
where the ethnic group employs the most workers in an absolute sense. The industry
size variable ranks industries from largest (1) to smallest (200) in terms of their overall
size in the economy. Most of the maximum-concentration industries in the rst two
industry lists are of moderate size; industries in the third set for highest absolute count
of ethnic employees tend to be larger industries.
We pause now to reect on some of the features displayed in these tables. First, it
is noteworthy from viewing the tabulations that some important factors outside of the
model are surely aiding group concentration but are not captured by our theoretical
and empirical work, while still being of a similar spirit in terms of the conceptual ideas
of this paper. For example, we treat the taxi industry as a single industry for our
empirical work, but in most respects taxi markets are segmented by cities. Frequent
travelers note the degree to which di¤erent ethnic groups appear to dominate the
taxi industry on a city-by-city basis, with the most important group for each city
being di¤erent. In fact, more broadly, many industries of maximum concentration
(e.g., grocery stores, gas stations) are cases where geography can play an important
role. This suggests we are likely under-estimating true concentration in this regard.21
A second, but seemingly smaller, factor from these tables is that taste variations in
services o¤ered could make for separate markets (e.g., restaurants). These taste-based
factors clearly exist and explain entrepreneurial clustering, but we nd it more exciting
and important to observe entrepreneurial clustering without resorting to taste-based
elements (e.g., it is unclear if Greek and Italian restaurants are really separate markets).
On a related note, social interaction e¤ects should in principle be relevant to any
setting where the complementarity between social interaction and skill acquisition is
strong. However, occupations and industries that require specic education and skills
that are typically acquired early in life are not amenable to the forces that we model
in which immigrants arrive in the United States as adults. Thus, adult immigrants
nd it harder to enter the medical profession, despite its signicant interplay between
social and professional interactions, given medicines deep professional requirements
and extensive training period. Many of the displayed entrepreneurial activities that
are subject to ethnic concentration have much shorter training cycles and fewer degree
or occupational licensing requirements.
5.3 Ethnic Isolation and In-Marriage Rates
Our theory emphasizes how entrepreneurial knowledge can be supported and di¤used
in tightly knit ethnic communities, and we predict that more-isolated and smaller
communities are more likely to display entrepreneurial clustering within a particular
21Unfortunately, the data counts become very thin for segmenting by geography using IPUMS.
Future work using universal linked employer-employee data can analyze these features.
26
industry. Our proxy for these social interactions is developed through within-group
marriage rates among ethnicities, which can be an e¤ective metric if sorting in the
marriage market is similar to sorting in other social relationships. Representative
work on this topic includes Kennedy (1944), Bisin and Verdier (2000), and Bisin et
al. (2004). High marriage rates within an ethnic group, also termed in-marriage or
endogamy, suggest greater social isolation and stratication. Mandor¤ (2007) shows
with the General Social Survey the predictive power of in-marriage rates for friendship
structures within ethnic groups. Conversely, groups with less in-marriage are more
socially integrated into the larger population. We use in-marriage rates to test our
hypothesis that socially stratied ethnicities display greater entrepreneurial activity.
We calculate in-marriage rates for ethnicities using a second dataset developed from
IPUMS. We focus on women and men immigrating to the United States between the
ages of 5 and 15 and who are between ages 30 and 65 in 2000. The age at immigration
restriction prevents the inclusion of children coming to the United States for adoption
since most of these children are adopted before the age of ve. Setting the upper limit
at 15 years of age prevents the inclusion of immigrants already married or immigrating
to the United States for marriage. We exclude individuals already married at the time
of immigration to the United States since their behavior does not model well levels of
social isolation in the United States. Due to these features, this sample is mutually
exclusive from that used to calculate our overage metrics.22 ;23
Most immigrant groups are socially segregated with respect to marriage, some very
strongly so. With random matching for marriage and equal male and female migration,
in-marriage rates would roughly equal a groups fraction of the overall population.
The in-marriage rates shown in Table 1a are much higher, with all but three cases
exceeding 50%. The table further shows the high entrepreneurship concentration of
these groups as well, with pairwise correlations of 0.51 and 0.60 for in-marriage rates
and the OV ER1l and OV ER2l metrics, respectively, among the groups listed in Table
1a.
22IPUMS identies spouses when both are listed as being in the same household. We do not require
the spouse to also be an "eligible" immigrant. For the marriage to count as an in-marriage, the spouse
must share the same birthplace location or ancestry as the eligible individual in the sample.
23We use the same methodology to determine in-marriage rates with the 1980 US Census of Popu-
lations and the 1991 UK Census of Populations, and these metrics later serve as instruments for the
2000 US in-marriage rate. We use a rate calculated at a regional level in cases where we have insu¢ -
cient data for an ethnic group. The regions are dened for birthplace locations along the same lines
as the IPUMS delineations. The IPUMS codebook denes the following regions: Africa, Americas,
Asia, Central America/Caribbean, Central/Eastern Europe, East Asia, Europe, India/Southwest Asia,
Middle East/Asia Minor, Northern Europe, Oceania, Other North America, Russian Empire/Baltic
States, South America, Southeast Asia, Southern Europe, US Outlying Area, and Western Europe.
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5.4 OLS Empirical Tests
Our empirical estimations focus on the core prediction that smaller and more-socially
isolated ethnic groups should display greater industrial concentration towards entre-
preneurship. To establish this, we use the following regression approach:
OV ER1l =  + 1SIZEl + 2ISOLl + "l; (18)
where SIZEl is the negative of the log value of group size and ISOLl is the log
in-marriage rate of the group. We take the negative of size so that our theoretical
prediction is that 1 and 2 are positive. We report all coe¢ cients in unit standard
deviation terms for ease of interpretation with our overage metrics. Our baseline re-
gressions winsorize variables at their 10% and 90% levels to guard against outliers,
weight estimations by log ethnic employment for each group, and report robust stan-
dard errors. Robustness checks below consider adjustments to all of these specication
choices.
The rst column of Table 2 shows a very strong relationship of group size and
social isolation to the three overage measures. A one standard-deviation decrease in
group size is correlated with a 0.63 increase in average entrepreneurial concentration
across all industries. Similarly, a one standard-deviation increase in the in-marriage
rate translates into a 0.52 standard-deviation increase in overage.
Columns 2-5 contain several robustness checks. Columns 2 and 3 show very sim-
ilar results when we drop our sample weights and winsorization steps, respectively.
Column 4 takes a more aggressive strategy of introducing xed e¤ects for each origin
continent. Doing so reduces both coe¢ cients modestly, yet they remain overall quite
strong. Columns 5 and 6 show similar results when using a median regression format
or when bootstrapping standard errors. These last two columns should be compared
to Column 2 given their unweighted nature.
Columns 7 and 8 introduce additional controls to consider whether smaller sample
sizes for ethnic groups create concentration ratios mechanically. Our metric design at-
tempts to guard against this, yet we can also conduct Monte Carlo simulations to test.
In these simulations, we randomly assign individuals to industries and self-employment
status. In one version, used for Column 7, we draw industry and self-employment sta-
tus independently from each other, which means that we tend to predict the same
self-employment rates across industries. In a second version used in Column 8, we
jointly draw the two components such that we mimic the industry-by-industry entre-
preneurship rates observed in the data. From these 1000 Monte Carlo simulations,
we calculate for each ethnic group the average observed overage. Introducing these
controls does not impact our estimations except that the size relationship diminishes
modestly.
Table 3 next reports robustness checks on our metric design. The rst column
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repeats our baseline estimation. Column 2 shows that a focus on the three largest
industries for an ethnic group (i.e., OV ER2l discussed above) increases the relative
importance of social isolation for predicting overages. Column 3 uses the full worker
sample, Column 4 calculates overages only relative to immigrant populations by ex-
cluding natives from the denominator shares, and Column 5 adds rural workers into
the self-employment overage calculations. The results are very robust to these adjust-
ments. Columns 6 and 7 examine extreme values using the OV ER3l and OV ER4l
metrics dened above. These extreme values show a weaker connection to group size,
placing even more prominence on group isolation.
Table 4 further tests the e¤ects of relative size and isolation on entrepreneurial
clustering by using non-parametric regressions. We partition our size and isolation
variables into terciles and create indicator variables for each combination of {smallest
size, medium, largest size} and {most isolated, medium, least isolated}. We assign
ethnic groups that fall into [largest size, least isolated] as the reference category, and
coe¢ cients on the indicator variables for other categories are measured relative to this
group. The results continue to support the theory. The top row of Table 4 quanties
that the [smallest size, most isolated] groups have entrepreneurial concentrations that
are 2.5 standard deviations greater than the [largest size, least isolated] groups.
Equally important, the pattern of coe¢ cients across the other indicator variables
suggests that the e¤ects estimated in Table 2 are quite regular and not due to a few
outliers having an outsized impact. For example, holding the ethnic group size constant
by considering each set of three rows in Table 4, higher levels of social isolation strongly
and signicantly correspond to larger overages. Flipping it around, holding social
isolation constant, smaller group sizes also promote greater concentration within each
isolation category, with the exception of the least socially isolated tercile.
In addition to these, we have conducted other robustness exercises. Perhaps most
important, unreported analyses assess whether our focus on self-employment gives
skewed results compared to the isolation of employer rms. We consider a modied
form of our overage measures that uses information contained in the Survey of Busi-
ness Owners (SBO) to adjust our metrics for industry-level propensities for being an
employer rm vis-à-vis sole proprietors. This can only be done under the very strong
assumption that ethnic groups have equal proclivity to become employer rms versus
otherwise. This approach yields very similar results to those reported, but we remain
cautious that this does not fully answer these questions. Ultimately, an important topic
for future research is to use employer-employee data that contain the ethnic origins of
founders and employees to better understand these relationships.
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5.5 IV Empirical Tests: 1980 Values
We next consider IV specications to test against reverse causality concerns (e.g., that
isolated business ownerships lead to greater social isolation or lower group sizes). We
use two sets of instruments. The rst set of instruments builds upon an idea developed
in our model, that initial conditions can have lasting and persistent impacts, which
is also shown quite strongly in this context by the empirical work of Patel and Vella
(2013). We thus use the lagged 1980 values of ethnic group size and in-marriage rates
in the United States to instrument for 2000 levels. The distinct advantage of these
instruments is that they can be calculated from the 1980 Census of Populations in a
manner very comparable to our endogenous regressors. Despite this comparable data
structure and collection procedure, the ethnic divisions in 1980 are less detailed than
in 2000 and thus, in some cases, the same 1980 value must be applied to several 2000
ethnic groups. We thus cluster standard errors around the 43 groups present in the 1980
data, with other aspects of the IV estimations being the same as OLS specications.
The rst-stage results with this instrument set are quite strong. The rst two
columns of Table 5 show that these instruments have very strong individual predictive
power and a combined joint F-statistic of 24.24 The exclusion restriction requires that
the 1980 group sizes and in-marriage levels only impact 2000 entrepreneurship to the
extent that they shape current group size and social isolation, which seems reasonable.
One possible counter to this, on the other hand, is that some of the 1980 respondents
are still employed in 2000, and this may carry with it persistence that violates the
exclusion restriction.
The second-stage results in Column 3 are quite similar to the OLS ndings. The
IV specications suggest that a one standard-deviation decrease in ethnic group size
increases overage by 0.76 standard deviations. A one standard-deviation increase in
isolation leads to a 0.52 standard-deviation increase in entrepreneurial concentration.
These results are well-measured and economically important. The size coe¢ cient grows
modestly from its OLS baseline, while the in-marriage rate coe¢ cient declines slightly.
The results are precisely enough estimated that we can reject at a 5% level the null hy-
pothesis in Wu-Hausman tests that the instrumented regressors are exogenous. These
IV results strengthen the predictions of our theory that smaller, more isolated groups
are more conducive to entrepreneurial clustering.
5.6 IV Empirical Tests: Gravity Model and UK Values
Our second IV approach uses as instruments the predicted ethnic group size from a
gravity model and in-marriage rates from the United Kingdom in 1991. This is an
24The F-statistic comes from the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F-statistic used when standard errors
are clustered or robust and is based o¤ the Cragg-Donald F-test for weak instrumentation.
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even stronger test of the model, with advantages and liabilities compared to our 1980
instruments. First, to instrument for ethnic group size, we use a gravity model to
quantify predicted ethnic size based upon worldwide migration rates to the United
States. The original application of gravity models was to trade ows, where studies
showed that countries closer to each other and with larger size tended to show greater
trade ows, similar to the forces of planetary pull. This concept has also been applied
to the migration literature, and we similarly model
SIZEl =  + 1DISTl + 2POPl + "l; (19)
where DISTl is the log distance to the United States from the origin country and POPl
is the log population of the origin country. For this purpose, we estimate log ethnic
group size in the United States as the dependent variable (without a negative value
being taken as in earlier estimations). Unsurprisingly, lower distance (1 =  1:56
(s.e.=0:22)) and greater population (2 = 0:38 (s.e.=0:06)) are strong predictors of
ethnic group size in the United States. We take the predicted values from this regression
for each ethnic group as our rst instrument.
For our second instrument of in-marriage rates in the United States, we calculate
the in-marriage rates in the 1991 UK Census of Populations. This approach is attrac-
tive as the social isolation evident in the United Kingdom a decade before our study is
only likely to be predictive of US self-employment rates to the extent that the British
isolation captures a persistent trait of the ethnic group. The limitation of this instru-
ment is that we are only able to calculate this for 24 broader ethnic sets than our base
observations. We map our observations to these groups and cluster the standard errors
at the UK group level.
Columns 4-5 of Table 5 again report the rst-stage relationships. The instruments
remain individually predictive of their corresponding endogenous regressor, and they
have a joint F-statistic of 35.5. Similar to the 1980 US instruments, the minimum
2SLS relative bias that can be specied is less than 10%. This implies that we can
specify a very small bias and still reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are
weak. The bias level is determined by the minimum eigenvalue statistic and Stock and
Yogos (2005) 2SLS size of the nominal 5% Wald test.
The second-stage results are again comparable to our core OLS ndings. The size
results are a bit lower than OLS, while the social isolation e¤ects are even stronger
than OLS, with elasticities of around 0.67. We now fail to reject at a 5% level that the
instrumented regressors are exogenous, but we do reject it a 10% level.
Table 6 shows a set of robustness checks with the two IV approaches. The results
are quite similar with the simple adjustments of excluding sample weights, dropping
winsorization, or using bootstrapped standard errors. We drop the robustness checks
of median regressions and continent xed e¤ects, with the latter being due to our direct
use of distance for predicted ethnic group size.
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The results with simulated overage controls are more interesting and deserve greater
comment. It becomes harder in the presence of the simulated overage controls for us to
establish a high-quality rst stage for the size variable. This is workable enough in the
case of the 1980 size instrument, but it is not feasible for the predicted size relationship
in the gravity model. Intuitively, both the instrument and predicted overage are being
built upon the same data, making it hard to separate them.
Accordingly, in Columns 5 and 6, we start by just instrumenting for the isolation
metric, entering size and the predicted overage as control variables. These results are
quite strong and comparable to the base IV. In Columns 7 and 8, we conduct the
double IV for the 1980 instruments, which maintain a rst-stage relationship, and nd
qualitatively similar results.
Table 7 shows comparable patterns with the alternative metric designs. The results
for social isolation are robust in all specications. Those for size are mostly robust, with
a few exceptions in Panel B with the predicted size instruments. Table 8 also shows very
similar results to those reported above when expanding the gravity equation to have a
squared distance term or an indicator for Canada and Mexico as bordering countries
or when using underlying components of the gravity equation as direct instruments.
In summary, and looking across the OLS and IV variants, the model developed in
this paper nds consistent support. The strongest ndings are those for social isolation,
which is a very strong predictor of entrepreneurial concentration. The weight of the
evidence also supports that smaller group sizes promote entrepreneurial concentration.
5.7 Earnings Estimations
Our model makes an additional prediction that members of an ethnic group can achieve
greater earnings when entering a common entrepreneurial occupation. In our frame-
work, social complementarities produce a positive relationship between earnings and
entrepreneurship at the group level. This prediction is in direct contrast to what would
be expected if discrimination in the marketplace is the most important factor leading
to segmented group occupations. The empirical work of Patel and Vella (2013) strongly
shows a positive earning relationship for immigrant groups and common group occu-
pational choices using the 1980-2000 Census of Populations data.25 To close the loop
for this paper, we thus provide a brief analysis of earnings and refer readers to these
complementary pieces for additional evidence.
Table 9 provides individual-level estimations of the earnings relationship. The out-
come variable is the log yearly income of individuals. The core regressors, which we
further describe shortly, measure the entrepreneurial activity of the individuals ethnic
25Related work also includes Chiswick (1978), Borjas (1987), Simon and Warner (1992), Rauch
(2001), Mandor¤ (2007), Bayer et al. (2008), and Beaman (2012).
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group and whether the individual is self-employed. The sample is taken from the 2000
Census IPUMS. We include males aged 30-65 in 2000. Our sample contains all native
males and immigrant males who migrate after 1968 (e¤ective date of the Immigra-
tion Reform Act of 1965) and have lived in the United States for at least 10 years.
Sample excludes workers whose self-employment status is unknown or not applicable,
industries without self-employment, and workers living outside of metropolitan areas.
We report three core explanatory variables. The rst is whether the individual
is self-employed. The second is the percentage of an individuals group who are self-
employed (similar to the values reported in Table 1a), regardless of industry. Third, we
measure the share of the individuals ethnic group that are employed in the industry
of the focal individual. With the model developed, we anticipate both of these group
measures to have positive predictive power. For natives, these latter variables are
simply measured over the whole US-born population.
Our estimations also include many unreported controls for individuals that relate to
earnings. We include xed e¤ects for PUMA geographical locations and for industries.
We also control for high-school and college education, whether the individual is a native
or an immigrant, whether the individual is uent in the English language, and xed
e¤ects for seven age categories and seven age-at-immigration categories. Regressions
cluster standard errors by ethnic group and use IPUMS sample weights.
The rst three columns show that all three elements are predictive of earnings.
Being self-employed (a binary measure) is directly associated with a 3% increase in total
earnings in the cross-section. A 1% increase in the rate of overall self-employment for
an ethnic group connects to a 1% increase in total earnings. To aid interpretation, the
bottom of the table also provides the standard deviation x beta coe¢ cient for group-
level variables; a one standard-deviation increase (0.0255) in group self-employment
connects to 3% higher earning. Similarly, looking at ethnic group concentration for the
individual in his particular industry, a 1% increase in group concentration connects to
a 0.6% increase in total earnings. In standard-deviation terms, the relative e¤ect of
5% is even larger than the 3% for group self-employment. Columns 4-6 show similar
outcomes when we exclude workers in professional occupations and holders of doctorate
degrees.
These results thus support the models structure. They also signal for immigrant
groups a potential positive benet from entrepreneurial concentration. We note, how-
ever, that this analysis and the connected empirical work of Patel and Vella (2013)
are just rst steps toward understanding this complex and important set of relation-
ships. We particularly believe it important for future theoretical and empirical work to
consider both owners and employees of rms. Empirical work can particularly target
employer-employee datasets to observe more detailed hiring and wage patterns; such
work can also evaluate job transitions during the assimilation of new members of ethnic
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groups, perhaps ultimately leading to starting their own business.
6 Conclusions
By distinguishing between market interactions and social interactions, we have devel-
oped a theory where social relationships reduce the cost of acquiring sector-specic
skills for entrepreneurship. As a result, occupational choice reinforces initial group dif-
ferences, and di¤erent ethnic groups cluster in di¤erent industries. The scale economies
generated by social relationships imply that social interactions, as opposed to market
interactions, can result in favorable economic outcomes and self-employment conditions
for minority groups. This is true when interactions are random or endogenous, with
a key condition being that social relationships must not be close substitutes for one
another for the broadest predictions to hold. A natural extension is to apply these
theoretical concepts to the intergenerational transmission of skills and to follow occu-
pational structure and entrepreneurial persistence across generations. This interaction
mechanism can also be applied to the study of the transmission of other types of skills
beyond entrepreneurship.
Taken as a whole, the Census data are consistent with social complementarities
in skill acquisition operating as a stratifying force, contributing to the persistence of
di¤erences in occupational structure, entrepreneurship, and group inequality. Census
data on occupational choice show that ethnic clustering is an important aspect of en-
trepreneurial activity. Mean earnings and entrepreneurship are positively related at
the group level when controlling for other factors. Using intermarriage data in the
Census as a proxy for social interactions, we nd that entrepreneurial groups social-
ize mostly within their own group, and that stratication appears to increase with
in-marriage. These results are also consistent with the economic success and social iso-
lation of specialized minority groups throughout history. We hope that the predictions
of this theory for ethnic entrepreneurship can be evaluated in settings outside of the
United States given its general nature (Fairlie et al., 2010). Further connecting this to
ethnic enclaves and employer-employee data will also be powerful.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Derivation: Earnings Di¤erential in Figure 6
Mean earnings denominated in terms of goods are:
 (Xl)
p0
=
Z Xl
0
p 1 (Xl) s1 (i) di+
Z 1
Xl
s0 (i) di: (20)
Replace the relative price of goods to services, p = p0
p1
, with the comparative advantage
of the marginal entrepreneur, q, since these two are equal in equilibrium. Denote the
earnings di¤erential as  (Xl; Xl0)  (Xl) (Xl0 )p0 . It can be expressed as:
 (Xl; Xl0) =
Z Xl0
0
q 1 ( (Xl)   (Xl0)) s1 (i) di+
Z Xl
Xl0

q 1 (Xl) s1 (i)  s0 (i)

di:
(21)
For Xl < 1 and Xl0 = 0, where q = q (Xl; Xl), and q (Xl; Xl) =  (Xl) s (Xl), di¤erenti-
ating with respect to Xl gives
@ (Xl; 0)
@Xl
=  s0 (Xl) s (Xl) 2
Z Xl
0
s1 (i) di > 0: (22)
For Xl = 1 and Xl0 = 0, the drop in price from q (1; 1) to q (0; 0) results in a jump in
the mean earnings di¤erential equal to
 (1; 0)jp=q(0;0)    (1; 0)jp=q(1;1) =
 
q (0; 0) 1   q (1; 1) 1  (1)Z 1
0
s1 (i) di > 0: (23)
For x = 1 and Xl0 > 0, where q = q (Xl0 ; Xl0), di¤erentiating with respect to Xl0 gives
@ (1; Xl0)
@Xl0
=   dq
dXl0
q 2 (1)
Z 1
0
s1 (i) di+s
0 (Xl0) s (Xl0)
 2
Z Xl0
0
s1 (i) di 2s0 (Xl0) < 0:
(24)
7.2 Proof: Stratication
Proposition 3 Initial di¤erences result in long-run specialization: if group l is more
specialized that group l0 initially, X0l > X
0
l0, then group l specializes in the long run
and the limiting distribution is
 
X lA; X
l
B

.
Proof : Consider the equilibrium sequence of occupational distributions:  
X1A; X
1
B

;
 
X2A; X
2
B

; :::

(25)
40
If one group l is more specialized than the other group l0 initially, X0l > X
0
l0 , supply in
(9) requires that the equilibrium sequence begins in one of the following three ways:
  
X1l ; X
1
l0

;
 
X2l ; X
2
l0

; :::

=
8<:
((< 1; 0) ; :::)
((1; 0) ; (1; 0) ; :::)
((1; 0) ; (< 1; 0) ; :::) :
(26)
The proof proceeds by establishing that the sequence converges to
 
X lA; X
l
B

in each
of these three cases. Dene the variable  (Xl)  (Xl)Xl for Xl > 0. From Assumption
2 it follows that 0 (Xl) < 0. Proceed to establish convergence:
Case 1 X1l < 1 and X
1
l0 = 0.
Show rst that group l0 stays out of entrepreneurship for good. By contradiction:
if not, then there exists a time t where X t+1l0 = 0 and X
t+2
l0 > 0. Since supply must
satisfy (10) it then follows that X t+1l > 0 and X
t+2
l = 1. The change in the supply of
services can then be written as:
Qt+21  Qt+11 = Nl
 

 
X t+1l
 X t+1l   X tl +X t+2l0 Nl0  X t+1l0  : (27)
This di¤erence is strictly positive if the rst term is positive. Clearly this is the case if
X t+1l  X tl . If, instead, X t+1l < X tl , then again focusing on the rst term:

 
X t+1l
 X t+1l   X tl  =   X t+1l X t+1l  X t+1l   X tl X tl (28)
= X t+1l
 

 
X t+1l
    X tl X tl  > 0:
This establishes that Qt+21 > Q
t+1
1 . Since the supply of goods and services must move
in the same direction to clear the market, because of perfect complementarity, it follows
that the supply of goods also increases from t + 1 to t + 2. This in turn requires that
the number of workers increases, or equivalently, that the number of entrepreneurs
decreases:
X t+2l Nl +X
t+2
l0 Nl0 < X
t+1
l Nl +X
t+1
l0 Nl0 : (29)
Since X t+2l = 1 and X
t+1
l0 = 0, this inequality can be simplied as Nl + X
t+2
l0 Nl0 <
X t+1l Nl. This inequality is a contradiction and establishes that group l
0 stays out of
entrepreneurship for good. The stationary equilibrium must consequently be of the
form
 
X ll ; 0

.
Assume rst that X tl > X
, in which case it is easy to show that Qt+11 > Q
l
1 > Q
t+2
1
as well as X t+1l < X
l
l < X
t+2
l . Since Q
t+1
1 > Q
t+2
1 it follows that:
X t+1l NA
 
X tl

> X t+2l NA
 
X t+1l

(30)
X t+1l 
 
X tl

X tl > X
t+2
l 
 
X t+1l

X t+1l
X tl
 
X tl

> X t+2l 
 
X t+1l

:
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The last line implies that X tl > X
t+2
l . The exact same argument, but with reverse
inequalities, can be made for X tl < X
l
l . Therefore, having established that X
t
l >
X t+2l > X
l
l when X
t
l > X
l
l , and vice versa when X
t
l < X
l
l , it has been shown that X
t
l
approaches the stationary equilibrium valueX ll over time. This establishes convergence
in Case 1.
Case 2 X1l = 1, X
1
l0  0, X2l = 1 and X2l0  0.
Show rst that in this case, group l stays specialized for good. By contradiction:
if not, then there exists a time t when X tl = 1, X
t+1
l = 1 and X
t+2
l < 1. Since supply
must satisfy (10), it follows that X t+2l0 = 0. The change in the supply of services can
be written as
Qt+21  Qt+11 = Nl
 
X t+2l  (1)   (1)
 X t+1l0 Nl0  X tl  < 0: (31)
Since the supply of goods and services must move in the same direction to clear the
market, it follows that the supply of goods also decreases, which requires that the
number of entrepreneurs increases:
X t+2l Nl +X
t+2
l0 Nl0 > X
t+1
l Nl +X
t+1
l0 Nl0 : (32)
Since X t+2l0 = 0 and X
t+1
l = 1, this inequality can be rewritten as X
t+2
l Nl > Nl +
X t+1l0 Nl0 , which is a contradiction. This establishes that group l stays specialized in
entrepreneurship for good. The stationary equilibrium must consequently be of the
form
 
1; X ll0

. By the same argument as in Case 1, the sequence can be shown to
approach the stationary equilibrium value X ll0 over time, both if X
t
l0 > X
l
l0 and if
X tl0 < X
l
l0 . This establishes convergence in Case 2.
Case 3 X1l = 1 and X
1
l0  0 and X2l < 1 and X2l0 = 0.
By the same argument in Case 1, it follows that group l0 stays out of entrepre-
neurship permanently. Repeating the arguments in Case 1, convergence can then be
established also in Case 3.
Consequently, in all three cases there is convergence. 
7.3 Proof: Assortative Matching
Show that the e¢ cient one-sided matching is assortative. The matching function v is
symmetric and the cross-derivative positive. For traits t1 < t2 < t3 < t4, show that the
only e¢ cient matching is (t1; t2) and (t3; t4). As in Becker (1973), use a property of v
when the cross-derivative is positive
v (a; d) + v (c; b) < v (a; b) + v (c; d) (33)
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for a < c and b < d. Take an arbitrary e¢ cient matching (x1; x2) and (x3; x4), which
is a permutation of the traits t1; t2; t3 and t4. Without loss of generality, relabel these
traits pairwise so that x1 < x2 and x3 < x4. Also without loss of generality, relabel
the pairs so that x1 < x3. This implies that x1 < x3 < x4. Using the symmetry
of v, the aggregate utility from the arbitrary e¢ cient matching can be written as
v (x1; x2) + v (x4; x3). Since x1 < x4 it follows from (33) that x2 < x3, otherwise
aggregate utility could be increased by interchanging x2 and x3, just as b and d were
interchanged in (33). Consequently, with x1 < x2 < x3 < x4, the arbitrarily chosen
e¢ cient matching (x1; x2) and (x3; x4) is identical to the e¢ cient matching (t1; t2) and
(t3; t4). 
7.4 Formalized Intuition forWhy There are No Splinter Groups
To see why there are no splinter groups, consider a branching tree tracing relationships
in the population. Let  be the set of all families. Dene an arbitrary family in 
as the singleton set  (0). Let  (1) be the set of families in = (0) with at least
one family member married to someone in the original family  (0). Dene  (2) as
the set of families in = ( (0) [  (1)) with at least one family member married to
someone in  (1). Continuing by iteration to more and more distant relations, let  (r)
be the set of families in = ( (r   2) [  (r   1)) married to someone in  (r   1).
The variable r denotes what is sometimes called the degree of separation between the
initial family  (0) and the families in  (r). The degree of separation is a measure
of the social distance between individuals; compare Milgram (1967). The collection
of these sets, [rq=0  (q), constitutes a branching tree. The sets in this collection are
mutually exclusive, but if there are splinter groups, the sets are not exhaustive even as
r ! 1. Denote by s (r) the cardinality of the set  (r). Since each family in  (r) is
composed of d family members, where at least one member in each family by denition
is married into  (r   1), the expansion of the tree [rq=0  (q) is bounded by
s (r + 1)  s (r) (d  1) : (34)
If equation (34) holds with equally, then as r increases s (r) very soon encompasses
the entire population. It turns out that the equation generally holds as an inequality,
however. The reason for this slowdown is threefold. First, a person in  (r) could marry
another person in  (r). Second, a family in  (r) could have more than one family
member married to someone in  (r   1). Thirdly, several people in  (r) could marry
into the same family. These three types of events combine to prevent each family in
 (r) from contributing a full d   1 new families to  (r + 1), and consequently cause
(34) to hold as an inequality.
Applying the branching tree [rq=0  (q) to the e¢ cient assortative matching, the
branching tree is overwhelmingly likely to grow to encompass the entire population in
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the limit. Since the branching tree only expands to include people who are directly
or indirectly related, this limit result is equivalent to Proposition 5 that there are no
splinter groups. To see why the entire population is included in the limit, consider what
would happen if it were not true, if the branching tree died out without having reached
a positive fraction of the population. If this were the case, then  (r) would eventually
have to grow arbitrarily small relative to the remainder set = ( (r   2) [  (r   1)),
and therefore the likelihood that someone in  (r) married someone else in  (r) rather
than in the remainder set, or that several people in  (r   1) married into the same
family in  (r) rather than in the remainder set, or that several people in  (r) married
into the same family in the remainder set, must also grow arbitrarily small. But then
equation (34) should hold as an equality, implying that s (r + 1) > s (r), which contra-
dicts the premise that the branching tree died out without having reached the entire
population. Consequently, everyone in the population is either directly or indirectly
related, and there are no splinter groups. The formal proof is below.
7.5 Proof: No Splinter Groups
Proposition 5 The likelihood that splinter groups exist is zero.
Proof: Dene a d-regular multigraph with loops, where every vertex corresponds to
a family, and every edge corresponds to a marriage. A splinter group is equivalent to
an unconnected component of this graph. Assortative marriages on independent traits
generate a random conguration of vertices. A random conguration is equivalent to a
regular random multigraph, as dened in Janson (2000). A regular random multigraph
is asymptotically almost surely Hamilitonian for d > 3, Janson (2000). Connectivity
follows from Hamilitonicity, which rules out the existence of unconnected components,
and consequently, the existence of splinter groups. 
This proof most likely also goes through for d  3, since it really only needs
connectivity and since connectivity is closely related to cubic graphs. The fourth edge
is necessary in the case of multigraphs to ensure Hamiltonicity, but Hamiltonicity is
stronger than connectivity.
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Figure 1: Production possibilities with specialized 
occupational distributions. The ray v is the preference 
parameter over goods in the Leontief utility function. 
Along the curve with the kink V(1,0), all entrepreneurs 
belong to group A (below the kink) or all members of 
group A are entrepreneurs (above). Similarly, along the 
curve with the kink V(0,1), all entrepreneurs belong to 
group B (below) or all members of group B are 
entrepreneurs (above). 
V(1,0)  v* V(0,1)  v
X
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Figure 2. The efficient occupational distribution for 
different values of v. The minority group A specializes 
as entrepreneurs so long as the entrepreneurial sector is 
small enough. 
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Figure 3. Individual productivity and the three stationary 
equilibria: one specialized equilibrium with minority 
specialization (A), one specialized equilibrium with 
majority specialization (B), and one unstratified 
equilibrium (U). 
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Figure 4. Stable dynamics when the internal effect 
dominates. 
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Figure 5. Sorting versus interaction effects in individual 
productivity. The dotted lines illustrate how the 
interaction effect raises productivity at all ability levels 
when specialization increases from a to b. The solid line 
shows the productivity of the marginal entrepreneur, for 
whom i=X at every level of X. 
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Figure 6. The difference in mean earnings between 
group A and group B, for different values of v, when 
minority group A specializes. 
 
Ethnic group, 
designated by 
country of origin or 
sub-groups available 
in IPUMS
Weighted 
average 
overage ratio 
over all 
industries
Weighted average 
overage ratio for three 
largest self-
employment 
industries for ethnicity
Self-employment industry with max 
overage ratio
Total 
employment 
in sample
Share of 
employment 
classified as 
self-
employed
In-marriage 
rate
Yemen 50.0 64.2 Grocery stores 2,322 26% 86%
Eritrea 35.4 45.5 Taxicab service 3,338 17% 100%
Gujarati 32.8 59.4 Hotels and motels 26,373 25% 93%
Ethiopia 27.2 43.9 Taxicab service 8,760 14% 64%
Bangladesh 20.5 27.6 Taxicab service 11,770 16% 86%
Chaldean 16.1 35.0 Grocery stores 5,429 33% 88%
Haiti 16.1 29.8 Taxicab service 58,971 8% 75%
Ghana 15.9 20.6 Taxicab service 10,975 11% 68%
Afghanistan 15.3 20.9 Taxicab service 6,432 24% 76%
Nigeria 13.6 29.5 Taxicab service 27,232 18% 64%
Tonga 12.0 14.5 Landscape and horticultural services 2,685 27% 77%
Morocco 11.3 11.2 Construction 5,346 23% 32%
Punjabi 10.5 21.8 Gasoline service stations 16,453 27% 96%
Jordan 10.0 17.6 Grocery stores 7,674 35% 68%
Laos 9.9 3.6 Agricultural production, crops 19,635 9% 77%
Pakistan 9.9 18.5 Taxicab service 35,722 22% 83%
Dominican Republic 8.7 16.6 Taxicab service 70,576 13% 62%
Cambodia 8.5 7.8 Eating and drinking places 16,245 15% 82%
Iraq 8.5 3.4 Offices and clinics of physicians 4,598 32% 60%
Turkey 8.1 3.4 Eating and drinking places 10,438 27% 60%
Korea 8.0 15.0 Laundry, cleaning, and garment services 91,928 45% 70%
Australia 7.9 2.1 Construction 4,910 23% 32%
Hungary 7.6 3.1 Construction 6,697 26% 32%
Syria 7.5 11.0 Offices and clinics of physicians 7,623 41% 57%
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 7.3 9.1 Offices and clinics of physicians 4,010 26% 50%
Table 1a:  Ethnic groups displaying the greatest self-employment industrial concentration
Notes:  Descriptive statistics from 2000 Census IPUMS. Sample includes males immigrating after 1968 (effective date of the Immigration Reform Act of 1965), 
aged 30-65 in 2000, and living in the United States for at least 10 years. Sample excludes workers whose self-employment status is unknown or not applicable, 
industries without self-employment, and workers living outside of metropolitan areas. The overage ratios and industry titles are specific to self-employment and 
weight industries by the number of self-employed workers for the ethnic group. Two small groups that are partially composed of residual individuals are not 
listed in this table but have overage values in this range (Indochina, ns 9.4; Africa, ns/nec 8.2). The employment column displays the total workforce size 
included in the sample for each ethnic group. 
Ethnic group
Industry of max overage for self-
employed sample Index
Industry 
size
Industry of max overage for total 
worker sample
Industry 
size Industry of max total employment
Industry 
size
Gujarati Hotels and motels 108.1 31 Liquor stores 146 Hotels and motels 31
Yemen Grocery stores 75.0 13 Grocery stores 13 Grocery stores 13
Eritrea Taxicab service 61.0 77 Taxicab service 77 Taxicab service 77
Ethiopia Taxicab service 52.6 77 Taxicab service 77 Taxicab service 77
Bangladesh Taxicab service 47.1 77 Taxicab service 77 Eating and drinking places 4
Haiti Taxicab service 42.3 77 Taxicab service 77 Construction 1
Nigeria Taxicab service 38.1 77 Taxicab service 77 Hospitals 5
Ghana Taxicab service 35.3 77 Taxicab service 77 Hospitals 5
Punjabi Gasoline service stations 34.6 88 Taxicab service 77 Taxicab service 77
Korea Laundry, cleaning, etc. services 33.5 94 Shoe repair shops 200 Laundry, cleaning, etc. services 94
Afghanistan Taxicab service 32.5 77 Taxicab service 77 Eating and drinking places 4
Jordan Grocery stores 28.1 13 Taxicab service 77 Grocery stores 13
Dom. Republic Taxicab service 27.2 77 Taxicab service 77 Construction 1
Armenian Jewelry stores 25.7 138 Jewelry stores 138 Construction 1
Pakistan Taxicab service 25.6 77 Taxicab service 77 Taxicab service 77
Lebanon Gasoline service stations 23.5 88 Gasoline service stations 88 Eating and drinking places 4
Chaldean Grocery stores 20.6 13 Liquor stores 146 Grocery stores 13
Tonga Landscape/horticultural services 18.2 25 Landscape/horticultural services 25 Construction 1
India Hotels and motels 17.8 31 Offices and clinics of physicians 36 Computer and data processing 8
Portugal Fishing, hunting, and trapping 16.5 170 Dyeing and finishing textiles 176 Construction 1
Ecuador Taxicab service 15.6 77 Apparel and accessories 106 Construction 1
Iran Apparel, fabrics, and notions 14.3 144 Apparel, fabrics, and notions 144 Eating and drinking places 4
Vietnam Fishing, hunting, and trapping 13.4 170 Fishing, hunting, and trapping 170 Electrical machinery/equipment 14
USSR/Russia Taxicab service 13.2 77 Taxicab service 77 Construction 1
Ukraine Taxicab service 13.2 77 Taxicab service 77 Construction 1
Notes: See Table 1a. Table is ordered by the 25 largest self-employment overage ratios at the industry level for ethnic groups. The industry size variable ranks industries from largest 
(1) to smallest (200). The table also displays for each ethnic group the industry of maximum overage when considering all employed workers and the industry where the greatest 
number of workers are employed.
Table 1b:  Maximum overage clusters and industry employment ranks by ethnic group
Baseline 
estimation
Without 
sample 
weights
Without 
winsorization
Including 
fixed effects 
for origin 
continent
Using 
median 
regression 
format
Using 
bootstrapped 
standard 
errors
Including 
simulated 
overage 
control1
Including 
simulated 
overage 
control2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Inverse of log ethnic group size 0.634 0.630 0.629 0.552 0.586 0.630 0.509 0.524
(small groups have larger values) (0.069) (0.067) (0.062) (0.070) (0.092) (0.070) (0.188) (0.182)
Log isolation of ethnic group 0.519 0.521 0.511 0.485 0.529 0.521 0.550 0.538
(0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.091) (0.091) (0.070) (0.070) (0.067)
Log predicted overage1 0.155
(0.195)
Log predicted overage2 0.123
(0.186)
R-Squared value 0.612 0.626 0.629 0.650 0.428 0.626 0.577 0.612
Table 2: OLS estimations for log weighted average overage ratio for ethnic groups
Notes:  Estimations describe the OLS relationship between industry concentration for ethnic entrepreneurship and ethnic group size and in-marriage isolation. The 
outcome variable is the log weighted average overage ratio across industries for each ethnic group, where the weights are levels of self employment in each industry per 
group. Variables are winsorized at their 10%/90% levels and transformed to have unit standard deviation for interpretation. Regressions are weighted by log ethnic 
group employee counts in MSAs, include 77 observations, and report robust standard errors. Columns 2-6 provide robustness checks on the baseline specification. 
Regressions in Columns 5 and 6 are unweighted and should be referenced against Column 2. Column 5 reports pseudo R-squared values. Columns 7 and 8 include 
control variables for predicted overage ratios based upon 1000 Monte Carlo simulations. In these simulations, pools of similarly sized ethnic groups to our true sample 
are formed and randomly assigned industry and entrepreneurship status according to national propensities. From these random assignments, we calculate 1000 overage 
metrics for each ethnic group that exactly mirror our primary data construction. The average of these simulations is entered as a control variable. In the first version 
included in Column 7, self-employment status and industry status are separately randomized, such that we overall predict roughly the same self-employment rate in each 
industry. In the second version included in Column 8, self-employment status and industry are jointly drawn such that we overall replicate observed self-employment 
levels across industries.
Baseline 
estimation
Using three 
largest 
industries for 
ethnic group
Using total 
worker 
sample
Excluding 
natives from 
denominator 
shares
Including 
rural workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Inverse of log ethnic group size 0.634 0.375 0.595 0.398 0.602 0.130 0.068
(small groups have larger values) (0.069) (0.080) (0.073) (0.080) (0.072) (0.076) (0.076)
Log isolation of ethnic group 0.519 0.640 0.514 0.578 0.529 0.722 0.706
(0.067) (0.072) (0.066) (0.083) (0.068) (0.070) (0.075)
R-Squared value 0.61 0.51 0.525 0.470 0.585 0.533 0.508
Notes:  See Table 2. Regressions in Columns 2-5 provide robustness checks on the core metric. Column 2 restricts the overage measure to just the three 
largest self-employment industries for an ethnic group, Column 3 considers the metric that uses all employed workers for the ethnic group, Column 4 
compares industry-level overages only to rates of other immigrant groups, and Column 5 includes rural workers in the sample. Columns 6-7 consider 
extreme values among industries by ethnic group. These latter overages are done without reference to industry importance in terms of ethnic group self-
employment, but they do require at least ten observations exist for an ethnic group - industry cluster to be included.
Table 3: OLS estimations with alternative metric designs
Log weighted average overage across all industries
Log average 
of three 
largest 
overage 
ratios for 
ethnic group
Log largest 
overage ratio 
for ethnic 
group
Log weighted average 
overage across all 
industries
Log weighted average 
overage across three 
largest industries
Log average of three 
largest overage ratios for 
ethnic group
Log largest overage ratio 
for ethnic group
(1) (2) (2) (3)
(0,1) ethnic size in smallest third x 2.472 2.276 1.826 1.572
(0,1) ethnic isolation in highest third (0.188) (0.168) (0.155) (0.180)
(0,1) ethnic size in smallest third x 1.514 0.753 0.416 0.375
(0,1) ethnic isolation in middle third (0.271) (0.380) (0.368) (0.362)
(0,1) ethnic size in smallest third x 1.048 0.280 -0.654 -1.002
(0,1) ethnic isolation in lowest third (0.280) (0.273) (0.243) (0.251)
(0,1) ethnic size in middle third x 1.581 1.211 1.127 1.044
(0,1) ethnic isolation in highest third (0.322) (0.374) (0.253) (0.260)
(0,1) ethnic size in middle third x 0.908 0.573 0.351 0.338
(0,1) ethnic isolation in middle third (0.313) (0.314) (0.345) (0.362)
(0,1) ethnic size in middle third x 0.428 -0.038 -0.443 -0.542
(0,1) ethnic isolation in lowest third (0.228) (0.220) (0.276) (0.306)
(0,1) ethnic size in largest third x 0.802 0.944 0.927 0.767
(0,1) ethnic isolation in highest third (0.369) (0.361) (0.309) (0.300)
(0,1) ethnic size in largest third x 0.126 0.279 0.329 0.294
(0,1) ethnic isolation in middle third (0.312) (0.334) (0.297) (0.299)
(0,1) ethnic size in largest third x
(0,1) ethnic isolation in lowest third
R-Squared value 0.57 0.49 0.55 0.54
Table 4: OLS relationships with non-parametric forms
Notes:  See Table 3. Effects are measured relative to largest and least isolated ethnic groups.
Excluded group
First stage for 
group size
First stage for 
group isolation
Second stage 
results
First stage for 
group size
First stage for 
group isolation
Second stage 
results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrument for size 0.877 -0.063 0.706 -0.018
(0.044) (0.055) (0.069) (0.115)
Instrument for isolation -0.075 0.721 -0.142 0.587
(0.043) (0.114) (0.109) (0.078)
F stat = Bias = F stat = Bias =
23.6 <10% 35.5 <10%
Inverse of log ethnic group size 0.757 0.487
(0.077) (0.132)
Log isolation of ethnic group 0.516 0.665
(0.099) (0.119)
Exogeneity test p-value 0.034 0.091
Table 5: Baseline IV estimations
Instrumenting with 1980 ethnic group size and 
in-marriage rates in United States
Instrumenting with predicted ethnic group size 
from gravity model and in-marriage rates in 
United Kingdom
Notes:  See Table 2. Estimations describe the IV relationship between industry concentration for ethnic entrepreneurship and ethnic group size and in-
marriage isolation. The column headers indicate the instruments used. The 2SLS relative bias reports the minimum bias that can be specified and still 
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. This level is determined through the minimum eigenvalue statistic and Stock and Yogo's 
(2005) 2SLS size of nominal 5% Wald test. The null hypothesis in Wu-Hausman exogeneity tests is that the instrumented regressors are exogenous. 
The test statistic used is robust to clustering of standard errors. Regressions cluster standard errors by the 43 and 24 ethnic groups in the US 1980 and 
UK 1990 datasets used to build the respective instruments.
Baseline 
estimation
Without 
sample 
weights
Without 
winsorization
Using 
bootstrapped 
standard 
errors
Including 
simulated 
overage 
control1
Including 
simulated 
overage 
control2
Including 
simulated 
overage 
control1
Including 
simulated 
overage 
control2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Inverse of log ethnic group size 0.757 0.748 0.689 0.748 0.519 0.547 1.254 1.220
(small groups have larger values) (0.077) (0.072) (0.084) (0.085) (0.232) (0.116) (0.355) (0.332)
Log isolation of ethnic group 0.516 0.526 0.554 0.526 0.539 0.516 0.465 0.468
(0.099) (0.091) (0.145) (0.095) (0.122) (0.212) (0.133) (0.125)
F statistic 23.6 23.4 6.9 34.6 33.1 37.5 15.4 23.0
Exogeneity test p-value 0.034 0.043 0.100 0.011 0.915 0.912 0.014 0.012
Inverse of log ethnic group size 0.487 0.476 0.506 0.476 0.315 0.334 Insufficient Insufficient
(small groups have larger values) (0.132) (0.123) (0.091) (0.105) (0.185) (0.179) first stage first stage
Log isolation of ethnic group 0.665 0.639 0.464 0.639 0.772 0.751
(0.119) (0.111) (0.089) (0.135) (0.089) (0.091)
F statistic 35.5 34.1 13.5 20.0 40.7 29.8
Exogeneity test p-value 0.091 0.084 0.160 0.061 0.137 0.166
Table 6: Robustness checks on IV estimations for log weighted average overage ratio for ethnic groups
Notes:  See Tables 2 and 5.
B. IV results using predicted group sizes and UK in-marriage rates
A. IV results using 1980 ethnic group size and in-marriage rates in United States
Double IVIsolation IV Only
Baseline 
estimation
Using three 
largest 
industries for 
ethnic group
Using total 
worker 
sample
Excluding 
natives from 
denominator 
shares
Including 
rural workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Inverse of log ethnic group size 0.757 0.531 0.636 0.491 0.730 0.272 0.193
(small groups have larger values) (0.077) (0.110) (0.063) (0.135) (0.086) (0.126) (0.123)
Log isolation of ethnic group 0.516 0.696 0.469 0.771 0.532 0.759 0.720
(0.099) (0.091) (0.104) (0.113) (0.097) (0.087) (0.107)
F statistic 23.6 23.6 54.4 23.6 23.6 23.6 23.6
Exogeneity test p-value 0.034 0.019 0.403 0.081 0.040 0.042 0.078
Inverse of log ethnic group size 0.487 0.132 0.466 0.386 0.444 0.075 0.043
(small groups have larger values) (0.132) (0.109) (0.120) (0.141) (0.132) (0.100) (0.090)
Log isolation of ethnic group 0.665 0.861 0.550 0.696 0.712 0.905 0.853
(0.119) (0.125) (0.177) (0.130) (0.122) (0.104) (0.088)
F statistic 35.5 35.5 10.5 35.5 35.5 35.5 35.5
Exogeneity test p-value 0.091 0.022 0.107 0.687 0.055 0.239 0.464
Notes:  See Tables 3 and 5.
B. IV results using predicted group sizes and UK in-marriage rates
A. IV results using 1980 ethnic group size and in-marriage rates in United States
Table 7: IV estimations with alternative metric designs
Log weighted average overage across all industries
Log average 
of three 
largest 
overage 
ratios for 
ethnic group
Log largest 
overage ratio 
for ethnic 
group
Baseline 
estimation
Including 
border in the 
gravity model
Including 
distance 
squared in the 
gravity model
Using distance 
and population 
as instruments
Using distance, 
population, and 
border as 
instruments
Using distance, 
population, and 
distance 
squared as 
instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inverse of log ethnic group size 0.487 0.483 0.483 0.522 0.524 0.522
(small groups have larger values) (0.132) (0.131) (0.130) (0.149) (0.148) (0.150)
Log isolation of ethnic group 0.665 0.665 0.665 0.680 0.624 0.673
(0.119) (0.120) (0.120) (0.111) (0.084) (0.083)
F statistic 35.5 36.2 35.8 22.2 17.0 17.0
Exogeneity test p-value 0.091 0.086 0.096 0.029 0.063 0.024
Overidentification test p-value 0.174 0.283 0.394
Notes:  See Tables 3 and 5.
Table 8: IV results with alternative gravity model designs for predicted size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percent of self-employed in 1.145 1.122 1.091 1.067
individual's ethnic group (1) (0.334) (0.335) (0.347) (0.349)
Share of group that is working in 0.680 0.615 0.624 0.562
an individual's industry (2) (0.205) (0.201) (0.210) (0.208)
Indicator for individual being 0.031 0.033 0.030 0.022 0.025 0.022
self-employed (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Observations 1,560,890 1,560,890 1,560,890 1,286,318 1,286,318 1,286,318
1 SD change x beta (1) 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.027
1 SD change x beta (2) 0.055 0.050 0.050 0.046
Table 9: Estimations for log yearly income of individual
Notes:  Estimations describe the OLS relationship between log yearly income of individuals and entrepreneurial activity of their ethnic 
group. Sample is taken from 2000 Census IPUMS. Sample includes native males and immigrant males who migrate after 1968 (effective 
date of the Immigration Reform Act of 1965), are aged 30-65 in 2000, and have lived in the United States for at least 10 years. Sample 
excludes workers whose self-employment status is unknown or not applicable, industries without self-employment, and workers living 
outside of metropolitan areas. Baseline estimation includes fixed effects for the following person-level traits (category counts in 
parentheses): PUMA geographical location (625), industry (200), native/immigrant (2), age (7), age at immigration for migrants (7), 
education (3), and English language fluency (2). Regressions cluster standard errors by ethnic group and use IPUMS sample weights. The 
bottom of the table provides the standard deviation x beta coefficient for the group-level variables (0.0255 for (1), 0.0810 for (2)). 
Columns 4-6 exclude workers in professional occupations and holders of doctorate degrees.
Baseline estimation Excluding professionals and PhDs
Sample Metric (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Self-employed
Log weighted average overage 
ratio across all industries
1
(2)
Log weighted average overage 
ratio in three largest industries 
0.946 1
(3)
Log average of three largest 
overage ratios for ethnic group
0.923 0.961 1
(4)
Log largest overage ratio for 
ethnic group
0.859 0.927 0.966 1
(5) All workers
Log weighted average overage 
ratio across all industries
0.832 0.767 0.731 0.631 1
(6)
Log weighted average overage 
ratio in three largest industries 
0.835 0.796 0.785 0.685 0.948 1
(7)
Log average of three largest 
overage ratios for ethnic group
0.555 0.627 0.640 0.630 0.541 0.632 1
(8)
Log largest overage ratio for 
ethnic group
0.470 0.577 0.530 0.522 0.476 0.495 0.900 1
Appendix Table 1a: Pairwise correlations of various overage metrics
Notes:  Table displays correlations between ethnic group overage measures calculated on both self-employment and industry total employment. All 
correlations are significant at a 5% level.
Sample Metric (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Self-employed
Log weighted average overage 
ratio across all industries
1
(2)
Log weighted average overage 
ratio in three largest industries 
0.808 1
(3)
Log average of three largest 
overage ratios for ethnic group
0.588 0.789 1
(4)
Log largest overage ratio for 
ethnic group
0.569 0.760 0.971 1
(5) All workers
Log weighted average overage 
ratio across all industries
0.835 0.821 0.661 0.648 1
(6)
Log weighted average overage 
ratio in three largest industries 
0.706 0.859 0.719 0.678 0.872 1
(7)
Log average of three largest 
overage ratios for ethnic group
0.589 0.739 0.768 0.816 0.760 0.743 1
(8)
Log largest overage ratio for 
ethnic group
0.587 0.705 0.705 0.742 0.749 0.724 0.955 1
Appendix Table 1b: Pairwise rank correlations of various overage metrics
Notes:  See Appendix Table 1a. Table displays rank correlations between ethnic group overage measures calculated on both self-employment and 
industry total employment. All correlations are significant at a 5% level.
